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Table of Contents
2005
HR 550, the "Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2005"
was introduced by Rep. Holt (NJ).
HR 550 is the "gold standard" of verified voting bills.
It requires voter-verified paper ballots (VVPB),
mandatory manual audits, and increased security.
It prohibits undisclosed software.
It was carefully written after extensive consultation with many experts.
12/1/05. Congressman Holt has a new petition at
http://www.rushholt.com/petition.html
in support of his own HR 550,
which has 159 co-sponsors in the House and was recommended
by the Carter-Baker Commission.
The "Voting Integrity and Verification Act of 2005" (VIVA 2005),
was introduced by Sen. Ensign (NV) as S 330 in the Senate
and by Rep. Gibbons (NV) as HR 704 in the House.
These bills narrowly focus on voter-verified paper ballots.
They don't do everything, but they do what they do very well.
We support HR 550 and S 330/HR 704.
Scorecard--who is sponsoring Federal VVPAT legislation
The U.S. House Committee on Rules and Administration held
its first hearings on Verified Voting in Federal Elections
on June 21, 2005.
The statements submitted by the witnesses can be found at
http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2005/062105_hearing.htm.
David Dill, Professor of Computer Science at Stanford U. and Founder of
www.VerifiedVoting.org, made a straightforward and
elegant statement of the issues, explaining why paper
ballots and records are indispensable if we are to have confidence that our
votes are being recorded and counted accurately.
Bill improves the use of provisional ballots.
Hoyer Introduces the "Secure America's Vote Act"
Gazette.net, by Meghan Mullan, June 28, 2005.
Can HAVA money be spent on printers, for jurisdictions that purchased
electronic voting systems without them? YES.
HAVA funds can be used for "improving, acquiring, leasing, modifying, or
replacing voting systems and technology and methods for casting and counting
votes", which would include, at the jurisdiction's discretion, attaching
printers.
Lobby Days for HR 550 and S 330
National Leadership Workshop and Strategy Session
sponsored by Vote Trust USA
for state and local verified voting organizers in Washington, DC.
This event will follow the Lobby Days for HR 550 on Friday evening
through Sunday morning, June 10-12, 2005.
For this weekend event only, please RSVP to Kevin Zeese at kzeese@earthlink.net
2004
H.R. 2239 ,
The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003,
was introduced by Congressman Rush Holt (D-NJ).
It requires computerized voting machines
to produce a voter-verified paper trail,
and deals with other HAVA problems.
We urge the passage of HR2239.
Send an
email or fax
to your Representative asking him or her to become a co-sponsor
(sends only to Representatives who are not yet co-sponsors).
You can call toll-free to Congress at 1-800-839-5276.
For the current list of co-sponsors,
click here
and type in the bill number HR2239 and click "Search."
At the bill summary page, click on the link for co-sponsors.
Senator Bob Graham
(D-FL) introduced a companion bill in the US Senate with the same name,
The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003, and the same text.
It is bill number S 1980. We urge the passage of S1980.
Send an
email or fax to your Senators,
or call them toll-free at 1-800-839-5276
and ask them to co-sponsor S1980.
Senator John Ensign of Nevada
has introduced S2437, the Voting Integrity and Verification Act of 2004,
which requires a voter-verified paper audit trail.
We urge passage of this bill.
Please telephone your two US Senators, 1-800-839-5276,
and ask them to co-sponsor S2437.
On April 8, 2004, Senator Bob Graham introduced the
"Restore Elector Confidence in Our Representative Democracy Act of 2004'
or RECORD, bill number S 2313.
Instead of requiring voter-verified paper ballots from all DREs in November, 2004,
or the use of paper ballots that can be counted by hand or optical scanner,
RECORD delegates authority to the new Election Assistance Commission
appointed this year by President Bush.
The four commissioners would decide what election equipment
would be required based on a standard of
"technologically impossible to comply"
with a requirement for VVPAT.
The purpose of law is to set clear standards and procedures
so our government can operate in a transparent and accountable way,
but RECORD fails to do this.
RECORD encourages foot-dragging,
and does not create clear advance notice or time-frames
for what must be done to ensure election integrity.
It is an evasion of responsibility.
Regrettably the bill is sponsored by
Senators Clinton (D-NY), Boxer (D-CA), Nelson (D-FL),
Schumer (D-NY), Lautenberg (D-NJ), Hollings (D-SC), and Lincoln (D-AR).
Call the offices of these Senators, 1-800-839-5276,
and ask them to withdraw support from RECORD
and to co-sponsor Senator Bob Graham's
"Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act" S 1980.
More commentary on RECORD.
Senator Clinton (D-NY) previously introduced a bill called
The Protecting American Democracy Act of 2003, or PADA, S 1986.
Unfortunately, PADA was
vague
and would not ensure the security of the ballots cast, nor
independent auditability of the final tallies.
We opposed this bill.
Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) also introduced a bill in the Senate, S 2045,
The Secure and Verifiable Electronic Voting Act of 2004.
VerifiedVoting.org has a
comparison
of the three bills. We opposed this bill.
Voting with "Frogs" refers to
a "separation of functions" system, also called "Modular Voting Architecture,"
in contrast to "do-it-all/self-contained" systems.
The National Science Foundation announced that it will
provide $7.5 million over five years for a new endeavor called
A Center for Correct, Usable, Reliable, Auditable, and Transparent Elections
(ACCURATE). UC Berkeley is expected to receive approximately
$1.3 million of the funds. Aug. 15, 2005.
USCountVotes.org is a new volunteer scientific project.
They propose to objectively investigate voting patterns
through the creation of a database
of precinct level election and demographic data for all states.
Their goal is to develop analytical and statistical techniques
capable of pinpointing probable errors in vote counts
worthy of investigation, regardless of the parties involved.
National Academy of Sciences project for understanding electronic voting.
The CalTech-MIT/Voting Technology Project
has published a new report: VTP Recommendations to the Election Assistance
Commission on Immediate Steps to Avoid Lost Votes in the November 2004
Election. Also important: the Caltech-MIT/Voting Technology Project Report:
A Preliminary Assessment of the
Reliability of Existing Voting Equipment, Revised and expanded as of
3/30/2001. "The central finding of this investigation is that manually
counted paper ballots have the lowest average incidence of spoiled, uncounted,
and unmarked ballots, followed closely by lever machines and optically scanned
ballots. Punchcard methods and systems using direct recording electronic
devices (DREs) had significantly higher average rates of spoiled, uncounted,
and unmarked ballots than any of the other systems.
Project Update,
January 2003.
VerifiedVoting.org and David Dill of Stanford University
offer up-to-date news and what you can do to work for verifiable elections.
The many resources include a
newsfeed and an email
newsletter to stay informed! You can endorse the
Resolution on Electronic Voting
and the Open Letter to the House Administration Committee.
Dr. Rebecca Mercuri ,
internationally recognized expert on electronic voting. Read her analysis,
articles, testimony before Congress, and more.
The famous report on Diebold's insecure
software from Johns Hopkins University's Information Security
Institute, published July 23, 2003,
(see the report's page 22 for the very understandable conclusions). E-lective Alarm by Dale
Keiger in the Johns Hopkins Magazine of February, 2004, discusses the before
and after -- what happens when a computer scientist says that a computer system
is insecure? If it is a voting system, who listens?
Avi Rubin.
Dr. Douglas W. Jones
of the University of Iowa, three-term Chairman
(now Member) of the Iowa Board of Examiners for Voting Machines and Electronic
Voting Systems.
Peter G. Neumann ,
Principal Scientist, SRI International Computer Science Laboratory
(go to page 8 for the part on Computer-Related Elections)
Michael Shamos is or has been
a voting system examiner for the state of Pennsylvania,
professor at the School of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University,
and an attorney. His paper
Paper v. Electronic Voting Records -- An Assessment
makes several of the most bizarre statements in the controversy over
electronic voting:
Jeremiah Akin observed the Riverside County, CA.
Logic and Accuracy Testing Board's test of their Sequoia voting machines.
On September 9, 2003. His
report
reveals deficiencies in the testing procedures, as well as other problems.
Computer security experts APPOINTED in Virginia.
Chuck Herrin,
computer auditor and security expert,
explains what's wrong with computerized voting.
How to Hack the Vote, Short Version.
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
provides the public and policymakers with realistic assessments
of the power, promise, and problems of information technology.
The Trouble With E-Voting
by Sarah Granger, CPSR's Project Director.
CPSR Comments on the California Touch Screen Task Force Report ,
August 1, 2003.
4. League of Women Voters, National
Smart Voter info from the League of Women Voters, CA.
The LWVUS 46th biennial national convention (June, 2004) adopted a resolution on voting machines
which includes the
SARA test:
"In order to ensure integrity and voter confidence in elections,
the LWVUS supports the implementation of voting systems and procedures
that are: secure, accurate, recountable, and accessible."
Statement by Kay J. Maxwell, Present, LWVUS, Before the Commission
on Federal Election Reform, April 18, 2005.
Press Release:
STATEMENT BY LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF THE U.S. ON VOTING MACHINES,
Wednesday, June 16, 2004, 4:42 pm.
League of Women Voters Drops Support of Paperless Voting Machines
by Rachel Konrad, June 15, 2004, Associated Press.
E-voting Issue Splits League of Women Voters
by Rachel Konrad, June 10, 2004, Associated Press.
The article mistakenly says that the
League has 130,000 members, but the number is around 70,000.
Regrettably for their good name, until their convention in June, 2004,
the national League of Women Voters supported the use of
unauditable electronic voting systems with
half-truths, inaccuracies, and omissions.
Here is the response
to that position from leading computer scientist Dr. Barbara Simons,
Past-President Association for Computing Machinery and Member,
League of Women Voters of Palo Alto, California.
Chapters and individual members have
dissented
and asked the National to reconsider its position.
Tutorial:
Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems ,
League of Women Voters of Winchester, MA, March, 2004.
5. Myth Breakers -- Facts about Electronic Elections
www.VotersUnite.org
has prepared an eye-opening report,
Myth Breakers--Facts about Electronic Elections
about HAVA misunderstandings,
price comparisons of voting systems,
hidden costs of DREs,
election complexities added by using DREs,
alternative HAVA-compliant voting systems,
examples of election disasters, and more.
Join with other activists throughout the nation to hand-deliver
copies of this critical information to your local election officials.
Download the Myth Breakers (820Kb) and print it.
Make copies if you're delivering to more than one election official.
Go to www.VotersUnite.org for more info.
6. EAC, Election Assistance Commission
Comment by Rebecca Mercuri on VVSG, 9/30/05
Commission Adopts Initial Procedures for Voting System Certification,
Aug. 23, 2005.
The New EAC Advisory and What It Means
by John Gideon of www.VotersUnite.Org and www.VoteTrustUSA.Org,
July 21, 2005.
Comment period for Voluntary Voting System Guidelines.
EAC info and Guidelines
According to the EAC's press release, the EAC expects to "adopt" the
draft guidelines in October 2005, but expects the draft guidelines not to
become effective until 2 years (24 months) later (in recognition of a
comment and review process after the October 2005 "adoption").
E-Vote Guidelines Need Work
by Kim Zetter, July 7, 2005.
The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act on the
Administration of Elections for Federal Office
EAC report to Congress.
U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC)
Statement Concerning the November Election,
July 13, 2004.
Statement of
Abraham Lincoln, November 10, 1864,
on not canceling elections: "We can not have free government without
elections; and if the rebellion could force us to forego, or postpone a
national election it might fairly claim to have already conquered and ruined
us." At the time Lincoln wrote
these words, Confederate General Jubal Early's attacking troops were within 5
miles of Washington DC.
Voting Official Seeks Terrorism Guidelines.
AP, June 25, 2004.
Letter From the Open Voting Consortium
New federal commission begins examining e-voting issues.
Improving the Usability and Accessibility of Voting Systems and Products ,
report by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
produced for the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC)
as mandated by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).
Press Release.
7. NIST, National Institute of Standards and Technology
Improving the Usability and Accessibility of Voting Systems and Products ,
report by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
produced for the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC)
as mandated by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).
NIST is supposed to develop standards for electronic voting systems.
That project is no longer funded.
NIST,
The National Institute of Standards and Technology,
held a Symposium on "Building Trust and Confidence in
Voting Systems" December 10-11,
2003. You can watch the
webcast of the speakers and Q&A sessions.
8. Open Source or Free Software
Wheresthepaper.org supports the idea of open source and free software,
but opposes the use of computers in elections. The current focus on
computers is a smokescreen that keeps people from looking at
elections. Elections are about ballots and votes, not computer technology.
Ordinary non-technical citizen observers cannot witness the workings
of a computer. Citizens should not be forced to trust invisible
election procedures because a computer scientist said it was OK,
or a statistician said that some number was significant.
No pollworker or voter will know what software is in the computer at the time
of the election. Given that communications capability is allowed in evote
computers, the only way to evaluate election integrity is for voters to
mark their own paper ballot (whether by hand or by using a ballot marking
device for voters with special needs), and for people to maintain continuous
observation of the ballots from the time they are cast until the votes
are counted and the election certified.
Open source code is transparent technology, not transparent elections.
The average voter should not be required to read computer code
instead of watching votes on paper ballots being counted.
HR 550's prohibition of secret software:
(8) PROHIBITION OF USE OF UNDISCLOSED SOFTWARE IN VOTING SYSTEMS- No voting
system shall at any time contain or use any undisclosed software. Any voting
system containing or using software shall disclose the source code, object
code, and executable representation of that software to the Commission, and
the Commission shall make that source code, object code, and executable
representation available for inspection upon request to any person.
HR 550's language prohibits containing or using undisclosed
software at any time. This would make it illegal to download
an undisclosed patch in the last minute, as was done in Georgia, 2002.
The language also speaks in terms of "disclosure" rather than
"giving up proprietary rights". The source code must be disclosed,
but all proprietary rights are still retained by the software's owners.
They can still sell it, license it, profit from it, etc.
They just cannot conceal it. The software could be made available
to the public by the EAC the same way that the SEC makes
securities filings available to the public -- by way on
on-line database.
California Open Source Report, January, 2006
Free Software Foundation licensing info.
Breath-alcohol tests thrown out by court because of secret software,
June 5, 2005. (But for voting, secret software is ok.)
The Illinois state legislature passed a bill that opens
the voting system certification process,
HB1968.
Page 186, lines 19 through 25:
open source resource site for OASIS EML development.
Open Voting Consortium.
" The Open Voting Consortium intends to make
free voting software available for use in public elections
to begin a process founders hope will transform the voting system
from a fraud-prone, blackbox, proprietary, expensive,
idiosyncratic, unreliable system
to a technically sound, accurate, secure, inexpensive,
uniform and open voting system."
http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/ad/ovc-mar22-pressrelease.pdf
The
Open Voting Consortium
is a non-profit organization of engineers,
scientists, political scientists and attorneys from around the U.S.
and the world.
They are dedicated to the development, maintenance, and delivery
of an open voting system for use in public elections.
Their free voting software runs on inexpensive PCs
and accommodates different languages and scoring methods,
as well as voters with special needs.
They presented a
demonstration of free election software
on April 1, 2004, in San Jose, CA.
Interest from Italy.
Open Up E-Voting by John Adams, 2004
on the web page of the O'Reilly Policy Devcenter.
Elections Panel Recommends Voting Machine Ban, By W. David Gardner, TechWeb News.
InformationWeek, April 23, 2004.
The OVC and a voting
company, VoteHere Inc., have posted the source code for their respective
systems on Web sites so outside observers can study the software and report any
flaws. Security and privacy companies routinely make their encryption
algorithms public to encourage experts to test the code for weaknesses.
Open-Source E-Voting Heads West
by Kim Zetter, published by Wired.com, Jan. 21, 2004.
The Open Vote Project
is an open source effort to develop free software
for Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines.
Based on the
Australian System ,
where source code created by
Software Improvements Pty. Ltd.
is freely published for public review,
the Open Vote Project's initial goals are to make
a touchscreen voting system fully compatible with California election law,
including a voter verifiable receipt and easy access for the disabled.
Once accomplished, the project will then expand into
a global standard for secure, reliable, and full featured voting machine software,
including features such as multi-lingual ballots, vote-anywhere technology,
and onsite voter registration.
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
CFP'93 - Open Voting Systems, by Irwin Mann.
10. Blind Voters, Ballot Templates
Diebold and the Disabled by Kim Zetter, Oct. 12, 2004.
NFB's President, Marc Maurer, responds to Kim Zetter's article.
Ballot Templates
are a low-tech approach for blind voters.
They are used in Rhode Island and in other countries around the world.
Diebold pays attention to accessibility, but built their DREs and GEMS Tabulators to
facilitate and conceal fraud.
Relationship of Diebold and National Federation for the Blind,
BlackBoxVoting, June 16, 2004
HAVA, SEC. 301. VOTING SYSTEMS STANDARDS. . . . "(3) Accessibility for individuals with disabilities.--The voting system shall-- (A) be accessible for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and independence) as for other voters; (B) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) through the use of at least one direct recording electronic voting system or other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities at each polling place; and (C) if purchased with funds made available under title II on or after January 1, 2007, meet the voting system standards for disability access (as outlined in this paragraph). "
Research info on Jim Dickson and AAPD , or
here
Handicapped Access to Mark-Sense Ballots,
Douglas W. Jones, U. of Iowa, patented design for non-computerized
device for voters with disabilities to mark and verify a paper ballot.
Position of WheresThePaper.org
The Help America Vote Act requires voters with disabilities
to have a "private and independent vote."
That requirement should mean more than
a private and independent experience in a voting booth,
fiddling with a touchscreen or some assistive devices.
But in fact, electronic voting systems don't give anybody
a private and independent VOTE.
Every vote cast is handed over to a large number
of anonymous technical people who have been responsible
for the system from its initial design, programming, testing,
maintenance, storage, programming for the ballot, transportation,
and installation in the polling site.
And another cast of characters after the election.
A computer is only a tool created and managed by people.
Every voter using the computer is being assisted by these people,
so the vote is not unassisted, private or independent.
Without complete 100% audits and a requirement of 100% accuracy,
we can not know if these assistants are recording our ballot choices,
or counting our votes, honestly and without mistakes.
Voters who are blind, or have visual impairments,
would get accessibility, privacy, and security
if they mark paper ballots by using ballot templates
like they have in Rhode Island and in other countries.
There are data-to-voice scanners that can read the paper ballot
back to the voter through headphones.
There are accessible ballot-marking machines,
such as
Populex
or
Automark,
that can assist voters with a wide variety of disabilities.
AutoMARK has completed federal certification testing.
Their N number is N-2-14-22-12-001.
Press Release, June 23, 2005.
Actually, the AutoMARK is "2002 qualified"
(NASED and the ITAs qualify; the states certify).
Qualification is for a complete system, and the AutoMARK was qualified
with an optical-scan in order to be a complete system.
ES&S has no optical-scans that are 2002 qualified;
they used the M-100 and M-650 for the AutoMARK testing
and that makes the complete system only 1990 qualified.
One current strategy for disenfranchising voters
is to give them the experience of voting
without the reality. For example,
many provisional ballots won't be counted.
This is why demands for accessibility within the voting booth
need to be combined with demands for verifiability
AND actual verification of the vote.
Othewise voters with disabilities can end up with
a private and independent experience but not a real vote.
Sequoia's machines have been alleged to enable falsification
of ballots via the font files.
This means, for example, if someone knew that Spanish voters
favored a particular candidate, their votes could be switched
as a group through manipulation of the Spanish font file.
In a similar way, voters who use accessibility attachments
could be easily identified because of the different programming
("drivers") used to make the accessibility attachments work.
If someone knew that blind voters favored a particular candidate,
for example, their votes could be recorded as cast -- or differently
-- as a group.
On both Diebold and Sequoia DREs with vvpat,
the verification audio is NOT done by reading from the
voter-verifiable paper printout.
Rather the audio recites information from electronic memory,
which is potentially different from both
the electronic record of the votes and the paper printout.
Therefore the blind and others who need audio reading from their
paper printout are getting a sham, and cannot verify their ballot
in a way that is equal to sighted voters.
The vendors are controlling the accessibility of the verification
for the blind, and so far these products show disrespect for those voters.
(See column "Additional features" in
Accessible and Verifiable Voting Technology: A Feature Comparison).
Not all vendors have this problem. For example, AccuPoll prints a
Voter-Verified Paper Ballot on standard 8.5" x 11" copy paper
using standard computer printer ink (Lexmark).
The AccuPoll VVPB also has a barcode which can be scanned
to play back as an audio track.
The AccuPoll barcode and audio track use an industry standard format,
so it can be played back on any equipment made for this.
Thus playback equipment does not have to be purchased from AccuPoll.
If barcode-audio track equipment is not available,
AccuPoll also has the voter's choices in memory and can
play them back in audio at the end of the ballot from the machine,
It is clear that advocates of accessibility to the vote need to
concern themselves with broader evaluation of electronic
voting technology, or they will be sold a sold a promise without a reality.
Some prominent leaders of the accessibility struggle have
mislead their community by maintaining a focus solely on accessibility.
The sole focus on accessibility IMPLIES that someone competent
has examined the problem of computer falsification,
and determined that the issue does not need to be addressed.
But this is not true. No one other than vendors,
and corrupt or ignorant people with various stakes in evoting,
have proclaimed that opinion.
All
computer science studies
have said that evote machines from the major vendors are insecure.
One document in 2004 asserted,
"New Yorkers with disabilities have waited
for more than 200 years to vote privately and independently"
(and the claim keeps being made).
What would be lost by saying "New Yorkers with disabilities have been working
for a private and independent vote that can be
independently verified if cast on a computer"?
Nothing! And in fact the assertion as circulated
is historically wrong, sexist, and racist:
First, the private ballot was introduced in Australia
in 1858, and in the USA in 1888
http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/.
Second, women didn't have any vote until 1920,
except in a few territories or western states.
Third, blacks got the vote after the Civil War,
but many people of color didn't have a vote
they could exercise in safety until more recently.
Does the HAVA requirement for a private and independent vote
for all voters, including those with disabilities, mean that
our federal government has a commitment to accessibility?
Or does it simply mean that this government is using people
with disabilities in its fight against verifiable elections
and citizen observers of ballot-handling and vote-counting?
The New EAC Advisory and What It Means
by John Gideon of www.VotersUnite.Org and www.VoteTrustUSA.Org,
July 21, 2005.
Problems with Sequoia and Diebold
1. Neither Sequoia or Diebold is fully accessible,
so any purchase and expenditure of money now
will result in another outlay of tax payers funds when
Diebold and Sequoia decide to upgrade their machines with
sip-puff, joy sticks, etc.
Links
Letter from Harriotte Hurie Ranvig to Sen. Kennedy, June 27, 2007
California Secy of State Consultant's Report on Sequoia Systems
. . . "The implementation of a Sip and Puff device requires the voter to use an audio ballot. The instructions provided to the voter are for the operation of the audio ballot with the audio ballot keypad. Accordingly, the system provides inappropriate and unusable instructions to the voter. The screen is blanked out because the machine is in audio ballot mode. When the ballot is printed, the voter has no option to reject the ballot. The voter using the sip and puff device has no access to the help screens. To navigate the ballot, the voter can only go forward, either through the races or through the candidates within a race. At the end of the races or candidates, the voter can go forward and loop back through the items."
DOJ checklist to add or improve physical access at polling places
Survey: Disabled Prefer Absentee Ballots,
Daily Star, Otsego NY, April 10, 2006.
Accessible Voting Systems Vendor Fair Survey Results,
Oregon, April 4, 2005.
Touch screen not best choice for disabled voters
, by Aleda J. Devies, June 22, 2005
My Rationale For Filing An ADA Complaint Against the State of Florida
By AJ Devies, President, Handicapped Adults of Volusia County
(HAVOC), April 04, 2006.
Touch-screen voting machines are not accessible to the majority of people with disabilities.
Accessibility For All Voters - Has It Arrived?,
By Pokey Anderson, for VoteTrustUSA. January 11, 2006.
An Interview with Dottie Neely, Advocate for the Blind
Vote-PAD, Voting-on-Paper Assistive Device.
Blind voters don’t see eye to eye with election officials, 9/2005,
Greensboro, NC.
VerifiedVoting.org's resources on disability.
NAPAS' Position. NAPAS is the National Association of Protection
and Advocacy Systems:
AAPD approves Alito even though Alito
was against enforcing disability access
Congressman James Langevin
interviewed about voting accessibility in Rhode Island, by Jerry Mindes.
February, 2001.
EAC Testimony on Voting System Standards
by John Gideon, Information Manager, VotersUnite.org and VoteTrustUSA.org,
August 21, 2005.
No security at all, but very convenient:
Vote-by-Phone
Number and type of assistive features of different voting systems.
Nobody votes unassisted on a computer.
David Dill and Shawn Casey O'Brien team up!
On July 28, 2005, they issued a joint
statement demanding that the new EAC
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines mandate
accessible, voter-verified paper records.
Fed Court Upholds Volusia County Decision to NOT Use
Diebold Touchscreen Voting Machines
Blogged by Brad on 7/21/2005
Florida County at Center of Battle Between
Several Disabled Rights Groups,
Emergency Appeal Filed by Group Who Received $1 Million
Donation from Diebold
EAC Advisory 2005-004:
How to determine if a voting system is compliant
U.S. judge backs Volusia in voting-machine case
The ruling clears the way for fall elections minus touch-screens,
county leaders say. What the article does not specify is that
local disability advocates opposed paperless touchscreen voting.
By Kevin P. Connolly, Orlando Sentinel Staff Writer, July 22, 2005.
Accessible Voting Systems Vendor Fair Survey Results.
Evaluation took place on April 4, 2005,
and the survey was conducted by the Oregon Secretary of State.
On March 17, 2003, the Department of Justice wrote a letter
to Alabama Secretary of State Nancy Worley stating:
AAPD supports Automark, but other times they oppose it
and support DREs that are less accessible.
American Council of the Blind, Resolution 2005-16,
passed July 8, 2005,
in support of accessible Voter-Verifiable Audit Trails.
Electronic Voting in the 2004 Election, article in
"Voice of the Nation's Blind," A publication of the
National Federation of the Blind, December 1, 2004.
AutoMARK Voter Assist Terminal Demonstration, in
Windows Media, 16 minutes, 25 seconds, in high or low bandwidth.
Article is in "Voice of the Nation's Blind," A publication of the
National Federation of the Blind, December 1, 2004.
Blind voters sue, demand touch-screen vote machines
By James Miller, News-Journal Online,
July 06, 2005 .
Automark's main page
includes a link to a letter from the
National Federation of the Blind in Computer Science,
Curtis Chong, President, to Automark, praising the Automark.
More on the
organization.
Memo from Bob Hachey, President, Disability Policy Consortium
Disabled man casts first ballot on his own
using the AutoMark in November, 2004.
Arizona Voters first in nation to use Automark
from Jan Brewer, Secretary of State, AZ. Nov. 16, 2004.
Lies by accessibility advocates don't seem to matter.
Blind Voters Criticise paperless electronic voting machines,
posted 8/21/04.
The American Foundation for the Blind evaluated systems and
published a Product Evaluation in July, 2004, in AccessWorld
The Ballot Ballet: The Usability of Accessible Voting Machines
by Darren Burton and Mark Uslan. They found difficulties
with all systems tested.
Accessible and Verifiable Voting Technology: A Feature Comparison
Verified Voting Foundation, June 21st, 2005.
VotersUnite.org info on voters with disabilities.
Voting Experience in November 2004 Election
In Santa Clara County California - Using Sequoia Voting Machines,
by Noel Runyan.
With his degree in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science,
Noel Runyan has been working in human-factors engineering
for over 35 years, primarily developing access technologies
for helping persons with visual impairments use computers
and other electronic devices. During the 5 years he worked
for IBM, he was involved in the design and testing of the security systems
for both BART ticket machines and ATM credit card systems.
VoteTrustUSA on voters with disabilities
Electionline on 'Hybrid' voting machines is an example of
pseudo neutral reporting.
National Federation of the Blind tests the AutoMARK
Dec. 1, 2004.
Inspire accessible voting system for voters with visual,
language, or cognitive impairments.
New York behind on voting machines, Common Cause says
By Rebecca Baker Erwin, The Journal News
October 25, 2004.
Diebold and the Disabled,
By Kim Zetter, Wired News, Oct. 12, 2004.
Financial connections and a partnership between one disability group
and the parent company of Diebold Election Systems
raise questions about motives and conflicts of interest.
Blind group withdrawing voting machine lawsuit
By Devin Shultz, Lancaster Eagle-Gazette June 15, 2004.
A Verifiable, Accessible Vote,
June 14, 2004.
In a letter to the editor, Lighthouse International,
New York City's oldest and largest vision rehabilitation agency
serving people of all ages who are blind and partially sighted,
says they see no contradiction between accessible
voting and verifiable voting for all Americans.
The Disability Lobby and Voting
The New York Times, June 11, 2004.
Disability-rights groups have been clouding the voting machine debate by suggesting
that the nation must choose between accessible voting and verifiable voting.
Was money an incentive for some?
Don't trade flawed Diebold system for disabled access
Natalie Wormeli, Esq.,
Testimony before the California State
Senate Elections and Reapportionment Committee,
May 5, 2004, in support of SB 1723.
Weblog of Shawn Casey O'Brien,
political activist and author, co-host, co-producer of Access Unlimited
the disability awareness show heard every Tuesday at 3pm
on Los Angeles radio station KPFK, 90.7 fm.
Accessibility and Auditability in Electronic Voting ,
Electronic Frontier Foundation White Paper, May 17, 2004.
Blind voters rip e-machines
By Elise Ackerman, San Jose Mercury News, May 15, 2004.
The Americans with Disabilities Act: Does it Secure the Fundamental Right to Vote?
provides an overview of the substantial barriers to voting
that are faced by the disabled.
Lynn Landes' report
on the NIST Symposium
hints at the current politics surrounding accessible voting for the blind.
Blind voters get secret ballot ,
BBC News, March 22, 2001.
On October 10, 2003, the US
Department of Justice issued a
Memorandum Opinion
saying that DRE voting systems that produce a voter-verifiable paper audit
trail would comply with HAVA and the Americans with Disabilities Act so long as
they provide a similar opportunity for sight-impaired voters
to verify their ballots.
Voting Technology for People with Disabilities ,
a report published in March, 2003,
by Manhattan Borough President C. Virginia Fields and
The Center for Independence of the Disabled in New York, Inc.,
makes clear the types of accessibility features needed.
Follow the Money.
Doug Jones (see above, 2. Computer Scientists) reports:
12. Presidential Candidates on Verifiable Elections
Kerry promises vigilance at polls
By Brian E. Crowley, Palm Beach Post Political Editor, March
9, 2004.
13. Endorsers of Verifiable Elections
Essay opinion by Darryl R. Wold,
July 23, 2003.
The HAVA Requirement for a Voter Verified Paper Record.
Mr. Wold served as chairman of the Federal Election Commission during 2000,
and as a Commissioner from 1998 to 2002.
Many organizations
nationwide.
American Conservative Union Foundation
Unitarian Universalist Association.
UUA Resources
The Computer Ate My Vote
campaign by True Majority.
People for the American Way
endorses verified voting as a solution to security concerns,
and hopes for the development of systems that are fully accessible to disabled
voters as well as voters with limited English proficiency.
The
Democratic National Committee
's Resolution for a Voter-Verified Paper Trail
passed unanimously on Oct. 4, 2003.
Green Party of the United States,
May 21, 2004.
Many states have local organizations working for verifiable elections.
One example is the NY State Citizens' Coalition on HAVA Implementation,
which published a Statement of Principles on
New Voting Machines For NY State.
The statement calls for new voting machines to provide a
"voter-verifiable paper audit trail"
and incorporate "data-to-voice" technology
to ensure full access by all. 40 organizations have endorsed it.
Local governments are moving to endorse verifiable elections.
One example is the
Schuyler County (New York)
Resolution for a Voter-Verified Paper Trail.
On Tuesday, October 14th, 2003,
the Schuyler County Legislature passed this resolution
favoring voter-verified paper trail and urging New York State
to include that in its HAVA implementation plan.
14. News -- November-December, 2004
Click here.
Censored!, bu Camille T. Taiara, Sept. 7-13,
2005, San Francisco Bay Guardian.
Click
here.
Center for American Progress ,
February 18, 2004.
Newsfeed
from VerifiedVoting.org.
Investigative articles and breaking news
on voting security and democracy issues by Lynn Landes at EcoTalk.org.
Find out who actually owns the companies who make, certify, report on,
and lobby for the use of electronic voting machines.
Her 11-page list of electronic voting machine
failures
is one answer to the suggestion that we should "trust" the computer.
Black Box Voting.org
is the web site of Bev Harris, author of
Black Box Voting: Ballot Tampering In The 21st Century.
The nonprofit nonpartisan Black Box Voting
organization focuses on investigation and citizen audits of elections, and acts
as a consumer watchdog group for voting. Their investigations played a major
role in bringing this movement into being. Here is her list of electronic
voting machine
failures.
Excellent continuing coverage of voting machine news and politics from
Wired.
The Commonweal Institute has a useful
list of links
to many articles in the print and electronic media,
as well as other
information about electronic voting.
Pollwatch.org
is an organization dedicated to citizen exit pollers and has a good links page.
Scoop has a
list of links
to articles in the print and electronic media.
Maryland activists for
voter-verifiable paper audit trails have produced a great
flash movie .
To stay informed generally, there are many
alternative news sources
on the internet.
(Partial listing Only! Your most important resource is the
newsfeed.)
Call to Action on Electronic Voting
By Molly Ivins, Creators Syndicate, June 24, 2004. ...
If you don't think there are just as many bright,
14-year-old hackers who would rig a vote in favor of Democrats
as there are who would rig it for Republicans,
you've been neglecting the 14-year-old hacker set. ...
But I'm sure there are enough Republican conspiracy theorists
to contemplate the happy proposition that, while chairmen and CEOs
[of voting machine companies] may lean Republican,
there are any number of partisan Democrats lurking
in engineering departments and liberal moles in
software-writing offices. ...
72% of computer software projects are complete
or partial failures -- which means that the system doesn't work!
Computerized voting machines are no exception.
Why the Current Touch Screen Voting Fiasco Was
Pretty Much Inevitable
by Robert X. Cringely, December 4, 2003.
Georgia's "Faith-Based" Electronic Voting System:
Something's Rotten in the State
by Heather Gray. Published on February 12, 2004 by CommonDreams.org.
Read the University of Georgia voter satisfaction
survey
referenced in the article.
A Deafening Silence
by Brian D. Barry, March 4, 2004, CommonDreams.org.
I've always wondered what sound Democracy would make if it died.
Last night, I found out in Santa Clara, California.
The sound it makes is a deafening silence.
The evidence against electronic voting is so great,
why is are we still considering it?
Check out this group of new articles.
A Very American Coup
Ohio's sweeping review of electronic voting machines
turned up so many potential security flaws in the systems
that the state's top elections official has called off deploying them
in March.
Statewide electronic voting delayed
By Julie Carr Smyth. December 3, 2003,
Cleveland.com, The Plain Dealer.
The reports are available -- click "Statewide Voting Systems"
at
www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/hava/index.html
Electronic Rigging?
by Kim Alexander, President and founder of the
California Voter Foundation.
All the President's votes?
from the Independent.co.uk.
A quiet revolution is taking place in US politics.
By the time it's over, the integrity of elections will be in the unchallenged,
unscrutinised control of a few large - and pro-Republican - corporations.
Andrew Gumbel wonders if democracy in America can survive.
October 14, 2003.
The Theft of Your Vote Is Just a Chip Away
by Thom Hartmann. AlterNet, July 23, 2003.
A reviw of elections where electronic voting machines
appear to have altered the results.
Voting Machines Gone Wild!
by Mark Lewellen-Biddle, published in In These Times, Dec. 11, 2003.
"The backers of [HAVA] and the manufacturers of e-voting machines
are a rat's nest of conflicts that includes Northrop-Grumman,
Lockheed-Martin, Electronic Data Systems (EDS) and Accenture.
Why are major defense contractors like Northrop-Grumman and
Lockheed-Martin mucking about in the American electoral system?"
SAIC Connected To E-Voting Whitewash,
Sludge Report #156, August 23, 2003
How to Rig an American Election
Bald-Faced Lies About Black Box Voting Machines
Diebold, Electronic Voting and the Vast Right-Wing Conspiracy
by
Bob Fitrakis, February 25, 2004,
in the Free Press, Columbus Ohio.
A Brief History of Computerized Election Fraud in America
by Victoria Collier, October
25, 2003.
Voting into the void
by Farhad Manjoo of Salon.com, November 5, 2002.
18. Election and Government Information
EPIC's Public Information Requests on DRE Voting Technology,
Electronic Privacy Information Center
Foundation Center, non-profit guidelines and how-to's
The Election Center
Voting Irregularities in Florida During the 2000 Presidential Election
June 2001 Report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.
Greg Palast article, summary of Florida's 2000 "felons purge list".
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found that the purge list,
which contains 57,700 names, had 8,000 (14%) falsely purged individuals
(as the Palast article notes, nearly 15 times George Bush's 537-vote win).
Article with a copy of a page from the list with the names of 4
falsely purged individuals.
Democracy at Risk: The 2004 Election in Ohio,
Report from the Voting Rights Institute of the Democratic Party.
June 22, 2005.
The report recommends the use of
precinct-based optical scan systems which are the most
"accurate" voting systems available today,
reasonably priced, and which satisfy HAVA requirements
in a cost-effective manner with devices such as the ES&S AutoMark.
Election Agency Proposes Secret Voting Standards, June 14, 2005.
Documents obtained by EPIC under the Freedom of Information Act
reveal the complete draft standards for voting technology. The
standards, which were developed by the Election Assistance Commission,
could determine how votes will be tabulated in future elections. Other
documents obtained by EPIC reveal
vendor attempts to influence the development of the standards.
Elections: Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents Challenges,
by Randolph C. Hite, director, information technology,
before the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy,
Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census, House Committee
on Government Reform. GAO-04-975T, July 20, 2004.
From the conclusion: "The problems that some
jurisdictions have experienced and the serious concerns being surfaced by
security experts and others highlight the potential for difficulties in the
upcoming 2004 national elections if the challenges that we cited in 2001 and
reiterate in this testimony are not effectively addressed."
The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design
is available in English, Spanish, French and Arabic.
All editions are available for download.
Hard copy editions are also available in English.
The Center for Voting and Democracy
is dedicated to fair elections where all voters have an opportunity to be
represented. This web site has discussions of many democracy topics, such as
Full Representation, Instant Runoff Voting, Redistricting, Voting Rights,
Cumulative Voting, Student Elections, Plurality Elections, Voter Turnout, etc.
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
Is America Ready to Vote?
Election Readiness Briefing Paper, April, 2004.
What's Changed, What Hasn't and Why: Election Reform 2004,
issued January 22, 2004, by electionline.org,
the nation's leading nonpartisan and non-advocacy
source for election reform analysis and information,
provides an overview of the scope and progress of changes
to elections in each of the 50 states.
The booklet discusses election reform rules that were adopted by every
state and territory as a result of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002.
It finds that the states' efforts to fix election problems are hindered by lack of
funding, guidance, and confidence in machines.
Election Assistance Commission: Duties and Responsibilities
National Association Of State Election
Directors
with a list of
certified equipment.
Their
certification process.
Certification is now handled through the EAC.
List as of 9/2/05
ITA Approved Systems 1-03 to 11-03
The National Association of County Recorders,
Election Officials and Clerks
National Conference of State Legislatures
National Association of Secretaries of State
Boards of Election by State
(Updated 12/23/2002).
U.S. Department of Justice
US Dept. of Justice Threatens To Sue New York State over HAVA non-compliance,
NY Times, Jan. 12, 2006.
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil RIghts Division, Voting Section Home Page
March 17, 2003, Letter sent to all 50 states and the territories
March 4, 2005 letter
HAVA exempted the EAC from government contracting requirements,
so the EAC need not submit anything for bid.
This was because some desired the EAC to be able to start working
as quickly as possible. Sec. 205(e) (42 USC 15325) of HAVA provided that:
19. Equipment Currently in Use
Photos of components of various evote systems by CountedAsCast
Characteristics of Contemporary Voting Machines, October 2003
V-Box ballot box from Vogue Election Systems, space minimizer ballot box.
privacy booth, aka voting booth
Voting systems in use in Virginia
VerifiedVoting.org's Verifier Database.
Click on a state, then a county.
You can download the entire database for the USA and import it into a spreadsheet by
clicking their link "Download Map Data," or click
http://www.verifiedvoting.org/verifier/getMapData.php?topic_string=5std
here
Electronic Voting Machine Locations
Electronic Voting Machine Quick Reference Guides
from the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
Diebold in use, BlackBoxVoting.org's list as of July, 2005.
Report: More e-voting systems to be used this fall
by Hope Yen, Associated Press, in USA Today, February 12, 2004.
Election Data Services
has published a new
report
on what equipment will be used in the November, 2004, election.
Election Data Services'
list as of November, 2002
showed that 16.33 percent of counties were using electronic voting equipment.
Optical Scan equipment accounted for 43 percent, paper ballots for 10.5 percent.
IFES
(International Foundation for Election Systems)
performed an election technology survey between November 2002 to May 2003.
One of their findings is:
California Counties, and equipment used in the
March 2, 2004 Primary Election .
Iowa
, as of 1/27/03.
California
will use three different
types of voting systems in March: 32 counties,
comprising 53 percent of California's
registered voters, will use paper-based, optical scan voting systems;
14 counties, comprising 6 percent of the state's voters,
will use the paper-based "Datavote" system;
12 counties, comprising 41 percent of the state's
voters, will use electronic balloting systems.
Undervote Rates in North Carolina, comparing DREs,
Levers, OpScan, Paper, Punch Card, and Other voting technologies.
Optical scan machines had the most consistent and lowest
undervote rates of these technologies used in Nov. 2004.
Insecurity studies, photographs of unsecured evoting systems.
The famous
Johns Hopkins
report on Diebold's insecure software, from
Johns Hopkins University's Information Security Institute, published July 23,
2003 (see the report's page 22 for the very understandable conclusions).
Prepared for Maryland's Department of Budget and Management
by SAIC (Science Applications International Corp),
Risk Assessment Report, Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System and Processes
of September 2, 2003.
This is a greatly redacted final version.
Because the criticism of their system was replaced by blank pages,
Diebold was able to publish a
press release claiming that the study yielded positive results.
The Ohio Secretary of State's
DRE Security Assessment, Volume 1 of November 21, 2003,
is a 46-page Summary of Findings and Recommendations produced by
InfoSENTRY Services, Inc. The
full report
is 280 pages. (1.6 MB)
The Report of the
Fairfax County Republican Committee
, January, 2004,
calls on the Virginia
legislature to pass a law requiring disclosed source code,
a voter-verifiable paper trail,
and surprise recounts in 0.5% of all precincts.
The Washington Post reported
GOP Says County Was Unprepared, Urges State Control
by David Cho, January 10, 2004.
The Department of Legislative Services,
Maryland General Assembly, commissioned a
Trusted Agent Report
by RABA Technologies, LLC, published on January 20, 2004.
The New York Times discussed its findings:
Security Poor in Electronic Voting Machines, Study Warns
,
By John Schwartz, January 29, 2004. The Baltimore Sun reported
Md. computer testers cast a vote: Election boxes easy to mess with
by Stephanie Desmon, January 30, 2004.
Hand-counted paper ballots
were found to be the best and most accurate way of voting, according to the
Voting Technology Project conducted by political scientists at Caltech and
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The Voting Technology Project
compared the reliability of voting systems used nationwide from 1988 to 2000 and
came to a remarkable conclusion: "The most stunning thing in our work was
that hand-counted paper ballots were better than anything else," project
director Stephen Ansolabehere said.
The Study
.
21. Failures of Computers -- Are they Trustworthy? What Could Go Wrong?
EIRS, Election Incidents Reports for 2004, 2005
Palm Beach, Florida had the most in the country in 2004.
Included: over 70,000 voter activator card stuck errors,
(cards were not able to be inserted all the way in),
cards that are correctly inserted but the screen says "Invalid Card
Error". www.blackboxvoting.org has the report of the Palm Beach County audit.
FBI: Most Companies Get Hacked
YahooNews, Jan. 20, 2006. Are Boards of Elections Immune?
Microsoft Releases Windows Meta File Patch Early
Wall Street Journal, Jan. 5, 2006.
For all the good it does, technology often fails us in big ways
Posted by David Berlind,
December 6, 2005.
Honestly, it's hard to know whether to put this under the heading of
Conspiracy, Stupidity, or Incompetence. However you interpret it,
why would any Board of Elections use equipment so prone to irregularities?
Laziness? Irresponsibilty? Contempt for voters, elections, and democracy?
Citizen group suggest new state motto:
"There are always glitches", a quote from their Deputy Director for
Administration of the North Carolina
Board Of Elections Johnnie McLean, November 4, 2004.
Hart InterCivic Optical-Scan Has Weak Spot,
By John Gideon, Information Manager for www.votersunite.org and www.votetrustusa.org, July 5, 2005. Yakima County, Washington had a vote count Anomaly.
Is this funny? Not really, it is another demonstration
of how electronic election fraud can be accomplished.
After theft of information from 40 million MasterCard accounts,
you really have to wonder about the people behind the computer.
Here's an accident about to happen:
CREDIT FREEZE.., Washington Monthly, Political Animal,
by Kevin Drum, June 20, 2005.
5 New Consumer Reports from Black Box Voting:
who owns voting machine companies; who is paying whom;
more on powerline communications and voting systems.
As you read the reports below,
remember that most malfunctions are internal within the computer,
and undetectable without an independent audit.
All transaction-processing systems in
business, industry, and government are audited continuously
to ensure accurate results.
That's why our banks send us statements, and our bills are itemized.
"In my work with computers for more than 30 years,
for dozens of Fortune 500 companies, government bodies, and other clients,
I've seen systems produce errors and need fixes after years of daily use."
-- Teresa Hommel, creator of www.wheresthepaper.org
and The Fraudulent Voting Machine.
Electronic voting systems designed without VVPAT
have been designed not only to prevent recounts,
but to prevent the normal auditing that is standard practice
in the computer industry.
This means that fraud, hacking, and innocent errors are all undetectable.
When people who control our elections assert that they "trust"
computers that can't be audited,
something political is going on.
Outside the "business" of elections,
we do not trust transaction-processing computers,
we audit them and we trust the audit.
The latest list of electronic voting system
failures
from VotersUnite.org.
Failures by vendor
.
List of failures from VerifiedVoting.org
Any computer system can be corrupted by the
people who have access to it.
In this story, an employee of the software certification agency
rigged video gambling software as he was checking it out.
American Casino Guide
,
Press Release
Wrong Time for an E-Vote Glitch
,
by Kim Zetter, Aug. 12, 2004.
Wired.com. When Sequoia Voting Systems demonstrated its new paper-trail
electronic voting system for state Senate staffers in California
last week, the company representative got a surprise when the paper trail
failed to record votes that testers cast in Spanish on the machine.
Count Crisis
by Matthew Haggman, Miami Daily Business Review, May 13, 2004.
A scathing internal review of the iVotronic touch-screen voting machines used
in Miami-Dade and Broward, Fla. counties,
written by a Miami-Dade County elections official,
revealed that the tabulation of results may be flawed.
The review, contained in a June 6, 2003,
memo revealed that the vote images and audit log
created by these voting systems omitted some machines and ballots,
but reported other machines that were not actually used,
as well as "phantom" ballots.
Material on HR811 and S1487 is posted at
HR811/S1487
Daily Voting News from VotersUnite.org. Send an email to DVN@votersunite.org
Election Integrity News from VoteTrustUSA.org. Weekly. Send an email to contact@votetrustusa.org
For New Yorkers: news and alerts. Send an email to contact@nyvv.org
Numerous web logs are pledged to post and link to posts regarding
verified voting and Congressman Holt's petition for the next several weeks.
This is called a "blogswarm" and Kathy Dopp of UtahCountsVotes.org
is its organizer. A similar blogswarm last June gathered over
500,000 signatures in support of Congressman John Conyers' letter
to George Bush regarding the Downing Street Memos.
The web log organization that supported that effort,
the Big Brass Alliance, is supporting this effort as well.
http://frogsdong.blogspot.com/2005/11/support-hr-550-verified-voting-is.html
has complete details on this effort as well as a list of web logs
that have posted on the topic.
Senate Rules Committee Testimony of David Dill,
By David Dill,
Professor of Computer Science, Stanford University,
and Founder of the Verified Voting Foundation and VerifiedVoting.org,
Before the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, June 21, 2005,
Hearing on Voter Verification in the Federal Election Process.
On Thursday and Friday, June 9-10, 2005
a coalition of citizens and grassroots organizations
will join forces in Washington D.C. to garner strong bi-partisan support
for HR 550, Rush Holt's (D-NJ) bill that VerifiedVoting.org has called
the "gold standard" of verified voting bills. The event, organized by
Common Cause, Rock the Vote, VoteTrustUSA, VerifiedVoting.org, and others,
includes a Thursday night reception with Representative Holt, a tireless
leader in the struggle for voter-verified paper ballots and integrity
in the U.S. electoral process.
As of May 4, 2005, HR 550 has 132 cosponsors.
On Monday and Tuesday, June 13-14, advocacy will focus on the Senate
in support of S 330, the "Voting Integrity and Verification Act of 2005"
(VIVA 2005), introduced by Senator Ensign of Nevada.
RSVP at
http://www.verifiedvoting.org/contact/
For more info, see
http://www.verifiedvoting.org/legis
Senate Rules Committee Testimony of David Dill,
By David Dill,
Professor of Computer Science, Stanford University,
and Founder of the Verified Voting Foundation and VerifiedVoting.org,
Before the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, June 21, 2005,
Hearing on Voter Verification in the Federal Election Process.
EAC comment, 9/30/05
Two very important articles are
Florida 2002:
Sluggish Systems, Vanishing Votes and
A
Better Ballot Box? . NEW--an informational brochure called
Facts About Voter
Verified Paper Ballots , prepared in response to the myths and
misinformation that are currently being circulated by those who are opposed to
independent election auditing. It can be downloaded, printed on double-sided
paper, and freely distributed (if in its entirety and unedited).
My experience as an Election Judge in Baltimore County.
An Insider's View of Vote Vulnerability ,
Wednesday, March 10, 2004, Baltimore Sun.
Prof. leads E-voting debate
By Francesca Hansen, The Johns Hopkins News-Letter, March 26, 2004.
In June, 2004, Professor Rubin issued a challenge to the Independent Testing
Authorities: Can a Voting
Machine that is Rigged for a Particular Candidate Pass Certification?.
Questions you can ask of vendors
Jones Receives $800,000 NSF Grant To Study Electronic Voting:
Douglas Jones, associate professor of computer science in the University of Iowa College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, has been awarded a five-year, $800,000 National Science Foundation (NSF) grant to investigate the use of electronic voting systems in U.S. elections.
If you looked at Avi Rubin's Johns Hopkins
report on Diebold's insecure software,
now look at Dr. Jones' response
The Case of the Diebold FTP Site
--he saw the same software in 1997 and called the problems
to the manufacturer's attention!
His recommendations
for security in Miami-Dade are important.
Confusion of Myth and Fact in Maryland,
July 19, 2004, is Dr. Jones response
to the Maryland State Board of Elections' brochure,
Maryland's Better Way to Vote -- Electronic Voting: Myth vs. Fact.
..."public trust in the voting system is essential if the government is to
be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the electorate....
Sadly, Maryland's Myth versus Fact defense
contains a sufficient number of misleading assertions,
straw-man arguments and outright errors that it may well do more to fuel public
distrust than it does to assure the trustworthiness of the system it
defends.... A more appropriate defense might have involved squarely admitting
the defects in the current system and clearly documenting, for each, the
actions taken by the Board of Elections to deal with the problem.
How do optical scanners work, 2002
He wrote a chapter on open source for a new book:
P.G. Neumann, "Attaining Robust Open-Source Software," Chapter 7 in
Perspectives on Free and Open Source Software, Joseph Feller, Brian
Fitzgerald, Scott A. Hissam, and Karim R. Lakhani, editors, MIT Press,
2005.
Robust Nonproprietary Software by Peter G. Neumann, May 2000.
-- "the United States has been using direct-recording electronic voting equipment for well over 20 years without a single verified incident of successful tampering"
Shamos fails to mention that there has not been a single verified election using this equipment. This is a case of "Don't look, don't find."
-- "I am unable to discern any engineering difference that allows us to entrust our lives to aircraft but would impel us to avoid voting machines. Not to endorse questionable voting systems or trivialize the possibility of chicanery, but I believe I and the republic will survive if a president is elected who was not entitled to the office, but I will not survive if a software error causes my plane to go down." Shamos is the first technologist to claim that he cannot discern the difference between an airplane and a voting machine, such as, airplanes have pilots and are not transaction-processing systems. His defense of election fraud should disqualify him from any serious role related to elections.
Shamos' paper elicited a
rebuttal from Ron Crane and others of the Open Voting Consortium.
CFP'93 - Electronic Voting - Evaluating the Threat
by Michael Ian Shamos, Ph.D., J.D.
The first meeting of the new joint legislative committee
on voting equipment was held May 18, in Richmond, Virginia.
Two top Virginia computer security experts, Jeremy Epstein (Senior Director of Product Security, Webmethods, a Virginia software integration company) and Dr. David Evans (Assistant Professor of Computer Science at the University of Virginia), have been appointed as non-voting members to the "Joint Subcommittee to Study the Certification Process for Voting Equipment and Matters Related to the Performance and Proper Deployment of Voting Equipment".
The original legislation requiring inclusion of two computer security experts on the committee (SJ 371 by Senator Mary Whipple) was proposed by Virginia Verified Voting (VAVV.org). If you would like more information on the meeting, please contact info@vavv.org
Notable parts:
"Election administration is not rocket science and it is not computer
science. It is basic management."
"Some have suggested that the law should be amended now to address some of
the problems we saw in 2004. But, in the League's view, this would be
comparable to attempting to change the tires on a moving car."
EAC Advisory 2005-004: How to determine if a voting system
is compliant with Section 301(a),
a gap analysis between 2002 Voting System Standards
and the requirements of Section 301(a).
EAC Advisory 2005-004
Page 3 of the advisory specifically allows paper based systems.
(5) says: "Many jurisdictions use a paper ballot voting system
that requires the voter to submit his or her own ballot after
casting for purposes of ballot counting. Where such voting systems
are in use, such jurisdictions must to the extent reasonably and
technologically possible afford a disabled voter the same ability
to submit his or her own ballot, in a private and independent manner,
as is afforded a non-disabled voter.
Page 4 of the advisory, in the last sentence in the part about
disabilities says: "This advisory should not be read to preclude
the innovation and use of accessible voting systems other than DREs
for purposes of meeting this requirement."
One news article reported:
"Election Assistance Commission spokeswoman Jeannie Layson said states must
require that the disabled have the ability to vote, and that machines meet
certain auditing and accuracy requirements. But there's nothing in the act
saying that decades-old lever voting machines must go, she said; that's a
decision for the states to decide."
Activists have been saying this for years but the media and the
states ignored them. Now, when it is too late in most of the country,
the EAC opens up and tells the truth.
By their silence while the controversy raged, They deceived counties
across the country who wanted to hear from them that HAVA does not
require jurisdictions to replace their older voting systems.
All the while, vendors made billions of dollars.
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines.
Voter-verified paper audit trail standards are in Section 6.8 under 'Security'.
The current 90 day "comment" period (it started in June and ends September 30)
is actually for "internal" review, according to 42 USC 15362(d)(2).
The EAC is supposed to give the full Standards Board and Advisory Board
a minimum of 90 days to review the TGDC draft, after which the
EAC can vote to "adopt" the draft.
After the EAC has finished its internal review and votes to "adopt"
the TGDC draft, the draft is to be published in the Federal Register,
according to 42 USC 15361(f). The process of Federal Register
publication involves the following, according to 42 USC 15362(a):
(1) publication of notice of the proposed guidelines in the Federal Register;
(2) an opportunity for public comment on the proposed guidelines;
(3) an opportunity for a public hearing on the record; and
(4) publication of the final guidelines in the Federal Register."
19 All test plans, test results,
20 documentation, and other records used to plan, execute, and
21 record the results of the testing and verification, including
22 all material prepared or used by independent testing
23 authorities or other third parties, shall be made part of the
24 public record and shall be freely available via the Internet
25 and paper copy to anyone.
Letter to the EAC
Alan Dechert's statement, July 13, 2004, in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Press Release, Nov. 24, 2004.
OVC begins to lose its focus.
When Computers Vote By Jack J. Woehr, September 12, 2005
Photo of
Bruce James of the US Government Printing Office with
JCP Chair Bob Ney, AAPD VP Jim Dickson, and
Rep. Steny Hoyer.
Disabled Program Changes Decried,
Former RSA Chief Faults Consolidation.
By Brian Faler, The Washington Post, Monday, April 25, 2005; page A17.
White House Moves Disability Benefits to The Chopping Block.
EAC Advisory 2005-004: How to determine if a voting system
is compliant with Section 301(a),
a gap analysis between 2002 Voting System Standards
and the requirements of Section 301(a).
2. The feed for the audio verification for blind voters
is taken from the memory and not from the printer or printer feed
so any verification done by blind voters does not verify their paper ballot,
thus these machines are in violation of HAVA accessibility.
3. Neither system is certified to the 2002 standards.
Sequoia's firmware and/or hardware does not meet those standards.
Diebold's GEMs software is not certified to 2002 standards and
they have announced that their presently-certified software
requires a version update which may make their system 2002 qualified.
This new version will almost certainly cost their customers
more money when it has to be up-loaded on their voting machines.
. . . In other words, voters with dexterity impairments who need the
sip-and-puff will have to vote with no visual cues,
instructions that are incorrect, and no access to help info.
Does the EAC Really Care If Voting Machines Are Accessible?
By AJ Devies, Handicapped Voters of Volusia County (HAVOC),
March 10, 2006.
A Conversation With Brian Hancock, Election Assistance Commission's ITA Secretariat.
Copy of Devies' ADA Complaint Against The State of Florida
This is an accessible ballot-marking device that is NOT computerized,
a simple non-computerized
device that enables voters with manual strength/dexterity disabilities
to vote privately and independently using the same paper ballot
marked by other voters with a pen or pencil.
It is difficult to understand why the AutoMARK machine
in particular has become the focus of such intense criticism
when other machines provide far less accessibility
or no accessibility at all for individuals with dexterity impairments.
Georgia, Maryland and Washington, D.C., for example, have been praised
by some AutoMARK critics for the accessibility of their voting systems,
even though their machines are inaccessible to voters with
dexterity disabilities because they lack a dual switch input option
(described above) that AutoMARK and some other machines provide.
Redefining Mainstream: Judge Alito and Disability Rights
by Jim Ward, Pres. of ADA Watch/National Coalition for Disability Rights,
Jan. 25, 2006. The current federal government's commitment to
accessibility for voters with disabilities must be evaluated
in light of the nomination of Alito to the US Supreme Court.
AAPD Final Letter to Senate on Alito Nomination
Justice For All Email List, Article #2676,
Jan. 23, 2006.
Louisville company helps disabled citizens in Vermont vote by phone,
August 10, 2005.
Blind gain new voting option, Aug. 11, 2005, Burlington Free Press.
Phony touch-tones have been used to commit fraud for years.
If the disability access community doesn't start to learn about
technology and election security, they will be sold
one bill of goods after another.
In addition to hacking, there are issues such as stolen pin numbers,
not knowing who is actually calling in to vote,
and loss of the secret ballot because voter identity, the pin number,
and the ballot have to be tied together in the system.
The touch-tones (called DTMF) are easy to replicate:
a free DTMF tone generator can be
downloaded from the internet.
To change your vote-tone to a different candidate,
I can intercept an unsecured phone
line simply by putting a beeper next to the mouthpiece on the phone.
Another consideration: about half the states now have VVPAT requirements
The article says that a paper ballot is generated, BUT it is generated
and scanned at a remote location ("at the central server").
The voter cannot inspect it. At least some state laws require
the VVPAT to be produced, inspected and preserved in the polling place.
Voters who are not blind may have difficulty getting instructions via listening,
which they are not used to, and may want written instructions. Deaf voters
would not be able to use the system. Voters with a brain injury of some kinds
or voters with some manual dexterity disabilities would have difficulty.
EFF Supports Disabled Voters in Fight Against Paperless E-Voting
July 15, 2005, infoZine.
with Section 301(a) -- a gap analysis between 2002
Voting System Standards and the requirements of
Section 302(a)
This EAC advisory is supposed to clarify accessibility requirements
of HAVA and Federal Certification.
The advisory covers voters with disabilities and minority languages.
The advisory allows DRE and non-DRE systems,
states that the use of a privacy sleeve allows disabled
voters to submit their ballot independently and with privacy,
and acknowledges that for some voters with disabilities it might not yet
be possible to vote fully independently and privately without assistance.
It remains to be seen if this acknowledgement is used
to argue that voting systems don't have to be accessible
for voters with mobility issues, such as paraplegics, amputees, etc.
Page 3 of the advisory specifically allows paper based systems.
(5) says: "Many jurisdictions use a paper ballot voting system
that requires the voter to submit his or her own ballot after casting
for purposes of ballot counting. Where such voting systems are in use,
such jurisdictions must to the extent reasonably and technologically
possible afford a disabled voter the same ability to submit
his or her own ballot, in a private and independent manner,
as is afforded a non-disabled voter.
Page 4 of the advisory says:
"This advisory should not be read to preclude the innovation and
use of accessible voting systems other than DREs for purposes
of meeting this requirement."
"The Election Assistance Commission ("EAC") set up under HAVA will
eventually issue voluntary voting guidelines and guidance as to
what constitutes an accessible voting system.
Until that guidance is adopted, the voluntary guidance of the
Federal Election Commission on Voting System Standards can be
used to determine the accessibility of voting machines.
(These can be found at www.fec.gov/pages/vss/vss.html
at section 2.2.7 of the Voluntary System Standards)."
The letter can be found at
http://web.archive.org/web/20030423214900/http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/hava/states_ltr.htm
Section 2.2.7 is now at
http://www.eac.gov/election_resources/v1/v1s2.doc see page 2-12.
Section 2.2.7.2 states:
DRE voting systems shall provide, as part of their configuration,
the capability to provide access to voters with a broad range
of disabilities. This capability shall:
e. For electronic image displays, permit the voter to:
1) Adjust the contrast settings;
2) Adjust color settings, when color is used; and
3) Adjust the size of the text so that the height of capital letters varies over a range of 3 to 6.3 millimeters;
The currently qualified Diebold TSx does not permit the voter to
adjust the contrast setting, nor does it allow the voter to adjust
the size of the text. It may not have the feature of
adjusting the color setting.
Therefore, according to the opinion of the DoJ, it isn't
accessible.
AAPD - A Costly Lack Of Leadership
by Shawn Casey O'Brien, Truth to Power!, July 15, 2004.
. Almost immediately after the Hopkins
report came out, groups of handicapped rights activists began loudly defending
Diebold. Writers campaigning on behalf of disability rights almost immediately
began to characterize opponents of excessive reliance on computers as "a rising
chorus of geeks." There has even been well managed disruption of a
professional meeting by handicapped rights activists, at the USACM Workshop on
Voter-Verifiable Election Systems, where demonstrators (including Jim Dickson
of the AAPD Disability Vote Project) stormed the meeting and took over the
microphone to deliver their message supporting direct recording electronic
voting machines and opposing all forms of voter-verified audit trails as being
inherently inaccessible to the handicapped.
. This strident opposition to voter verifiability has baffled those who want
voter verifiability, since supporters of verifiability certainly do not oppose
the rights of handicapped voters. There is a strong possibility, however, that
this strident support for direct recording electronic technology is not the
result of dispassionate analysis, but the result of a partnership. On November
1, 2000, Diebold and the National Federation of the Blind settled a
lawsuit with Diebold centering on issues of accessibility of automated
teller machines. This settlement involved Diebold, the NFB and the Disability
Rights Council of Greater Washington, and while the focus was on ATMs, there
was also a five-year
$1,000,000 grant from Diebold to the NFB Research and Training Institute for the
Blind.
. This, of course, does not imply that handicapped activists are acting as
conscious agents of Diebold, but rather, that working in partnership with the
company, many handicapped activists may have developed a loyalty that colors
their perception of Diebold and of all stories that touch on the partnership
that they have developed.
article about Bev Harris
from the Seattle Weekly, March 10, 2004.
Activist: E-voting to be a 'train wreck'
By Rachel Konrad, Associated Press Writer,
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 3, 2004.
Videos Online as of July 5, 2005 includes the famous
garbage raid at the Volusia County warehouse, where BBV found
poll tapes and ballots in the trash, Broward County citizens standing up:
"What will it take for you to recognize that there’s a problem here?" and
Citizens standing up in a California hearing.
Former CIA Station Chief John Stockwell writes that one of the
favorite tactics of the CIA during the Reagan-Bush administration
in the 1980s was to control countries by manipulating the election
process. "CIA apologists leap up and say, ‘Well, most of these
things are not so bloody.’ And that’s true. You’re giving politicians
some money so he’ll throw his party in this direction or that one,
or make false speeches on your behalf, or something like that.
It may be non-violent, but it’s still illegal intervention in
other country’s affairs, raising the question of whether or not
we’re going to have a world in which laws, rules of behavior
are respected," Stockwell wrote. Documents illustrate that the
Reagan and Bush administration supported computer manipulation
in both Noriega’s rise to power in Panama and in Marcos’ attempt
to retain power in the Philippines. Many of the Reagan administration’s
staunchest supporters were members of the Council on National Policy.
Gentle readers, please do a web search on "ES&S Venezuela CIA 2000"
and variations of these words, and note the strategic
significance of Venezuela in the global oil business.
Example of EPIC's Info: No-Bid Contracts Go to Vendors with Close Ties to Election Advisory Group.
The Election Center is a private organization with public powers.
Collected info at North Carolina Voter
David Jefferson's Response to The Election Center's document,
"DREs and the Election Process," July 31, 2005.
National Task Force Report on Election Reform, June, 2005
Report without graphics (much smaller download).
New Report on Election Reform Dead on Arrival,
'Election Center' Becomes Latest Election Reform Group
to Have Sold Their Souls to Diebold, Credibility Matters.
Blogged by Brad on 6/7/2005.
Section VII is on "Electronic Voting: Accuracy, Accessibility, and Fraud"
The BradBlog comments on it.
THE ISSUE
By January 1, 2006, states are required to meet the voting standards
developed by the Election Assistance Commission to receive federal
funding. Most states have already applied for or received a portion of
$3 billion in federal grants to purchase new voting technology.
THE BACKGROUND
Researchers at Johns Hopkins University have found that current
voting technology standards do not ensure accurate election results.
The Election Assistance Commission is responsible for developing
standards that will establish trust and confidence in the
nation's election system.
THE SIGNIFICANCE
Secret voting standards undermine trust in the nation's election
system. The public has a right to review the proposed standards and
to know if those proposed by the Election Assistance Commission differ
from the standards recommended by independent technical experts.
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Version I,
Initial Report,
May 9, 2005.
PRIMARY EDUCATION
, a report issued January 9, 2004,
by electionline.org and The Century Foundation, examines both national and
state-specific election reform issues that could have an impact on the 2004
primary election season. To request hard copies of these reports, email
publications@electionline.org.
Updated List of ITA Approved Systems from 12-03 to 7-05.
Note that on this list (which is not up-to-date at this time),
it shows voting systems. According to the ITA Secretariat,
Brian Hancock, and a note at the bottom of the first of the links
(above) the ITAs only certify systems and not parts of systems.
US Dept. of Justice letter of Jan. 10, 2006
Bo Lipari of New Yorkers for Verified Voting responds, Jan. 12, 2006.
#727: 12-31-03 JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
Outlines Strategy For Effective Enforcement Of Election Reform Law For 2004
On March 17, 2003, the Department of Justice wrote a letter
to Alabama Secretary of State Nancy Worley stating:
"The Election Assistance Commission ("EAC") set up under HAVA will
eventually issue voluntary voting guidelines and guidance as to
what constitutes an accessible voting system.
Until that guidance is adopted, the voluntary guidance of the
Federal Election Commission on Voting System Standards can be
used to determine the accessibility of voting machines.
(These can be found at www.fec.gov/pages/vss/vss.html
at section 2.2.7 of the Voluntary System Standards)."
Section 2.2.7 is now at
http://www.eac.gov/election_resources/v1/v1s2.doc see page 2-12.
Section 2.2.7.2 states:
DRE voting systems shall provide, as part of their configuration,
the capability to provide access to voters with a broad range
of disabilities. This capability shall:
e. For electronic image displays, permit the voter to:
1) Adjust the contrast settings;
2) Adjust color settings, when color is used; and
3) Adjust the size of the text so that the height of capital letters varies over a range of 3 to 6.3 millimeters;
"The Department has previously expressed its view on the meaning of Section 301(a)(3) at numerous conferences of state and local election officials around the country. Section 301(a)(3) means what it says - all polling places in the United States which are used for elections for federal office must have at least one voting system which is accessible to persons with disabilities for use in elections for federal office on and after January 1, 2006."
"(e) Contracts.--The Commission may contract with and compensate persons
and Federal agencies for supplies and services without regard to
section 3709 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (41 U.S.C. 5)."
(HR 550 requires the EAC to conduct a certain percentage of audits
of the voter verified paper records in every State in every County.
Because the EAC would have to contract with outside companies
to conduct the audits, HR550 deleted the EAC's exemption, and requires
the EAC to go through rigorous government contracting procedures
to contract with outside auditors to conduct the audits.
. "Direct Recording Electronic (DRE),
generally push-button or touch screen voting machines,
are reported to be used by 16.1% of the election authorities;
and another 21.3% report plans to convert to DRE.
This means that just over 37% of the jurisdictions reporting
are now using or will be using DRE equipment.
Optically scanned ballots at the polling stations are used by 33.9%
of the election authorities with another 8.7% planning to use
this polling station count option.
Another 26.3% of the election authorities indicated that
they use optical scanned ballots that are tabulated at a central location.
Only 4.5% of the election authorities indicate that they plan a conversion toward
optical scanning using a central count."
California Counties Chart
Unredacted sections
Section 1
Section 2
Section 3
Section 4
Section 5
Press release: the Ohio SoS intended to hire SAIC
instead of CompuWare but SAIC had purchased a large holding of
stock in Hart Intercivic.
Are these the same machines? YES!
Was this company hired to whitewash the DREs? YES!
Report from a Review of the Voting System in The State of Maryland
Oct. 12, 2006, by Freeman, Craft, McGregor Group.
Smoking Gun!
New Mexico canvass data shows higher undervote rates
in minority precincts where pushbutton DREs were used.
Paper ballots tabulated by optical scan systems had nearly
identical presidential undervote rates for all ethnicities, but
where the Danaher Shouptronic and Sequoia Advantage
pushbutton paperless electronic voting machines were used:
-- Hispanic precincts averaged more than 3% higher
presidential UV rates than Anglo precincts
-- Native American precincts averaged more than 5.5% higher
presidential UV rates than Anglo precincts.
Don't like what you see?
Votes not cast for the right candidate?
No problem, just log on, then "White Out the Vote"
with this handy dandy Online Digital Ballot editor -
works well with any sort of digital ballot image.
This gadget will be the wave of the future.
Think of the possibilities when used in conjunction with votes
recorded by "alternative vote verification systems".
In response to the problem,
Florida Secretary of State Glenda Hood attempted to re
