Election 2004 > County
March 10, 2004
County releases polling report
Correspondence, written report regarding Touchscreen voting system used for the first time March 2, 2004 by the County of San Diego.
March 10, 2004
To: Supervisor Dianne Jacob, Chairwoman
Supervisor Pam Slater-Price, Vice Chairwoman
Supervisor Greg Cox
Supervisor Ron Roberts
Supervisor Bill Horn
From: Walter F. Ekard
Chief Administrative Officer
Attached please find the initial report on lessons learned with regard to implementation of the new Touchscreen voting system in the recent primary election.
The report covers our initial review of the problems that affected our polling places most particularly in the early hours after the polls initially opened. My intention is to provide periodic reports to your Board until we are mutually satisfied that all issues have been identified and addressed.
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer Alex Martinez is heading the team that is reviewing the matter. He will be given whatever resources are necessary to accomplish the task in an expeditious, yet thorough way. We have received a number of e-mails and calls from those communicating with your offices and would urge you to continue to pass along any additional responses you receive. Our task will include conferring with poll workers, systems inspectors, troubleshooters and voters to ensure we have a good basis of information upon which to make whatever changes or improvements are necessary.
Walter F. Ekard
March 8, 2004
To: Walter F. Ekard
Chief Administrative Officer
From: Alex A. Martinez
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer
INITIAL REPORT- MARCH 2, 2004 PRIMARY ELECTION
Attached is the Initial Report on the March 2, 2004 Primary Election. In response to your direction, a Review Team of senior county managers has been convened to examine all aspects of the election process. The Initial Report includes an assessment-to-date of the Primary Election by the Review Team. The report provides a background on election preparation activities, identifies preliminary findings, both positive and negative, and offers recommended remedial actions.
As you know, many counties throughout California conducted this election on new electronic systems, and experienced similar difficulties. The United States Department of Justice, the California Secretary of State, and the California Department of Justice monitored this election. The California Secretary of State also conducted "parallel monitoring" of the electronic devices in certain California counties, including San Diego.
As a result, the Review Team expects to receive copies of any assessments these entities might issue in the near future and will incorporate these findings and recommendati ons in subsequent reports to you and the Board of Supervisors. We will also utilize public input in the formation of future recommendations.
I expect to issue a follow up report in 30 days. Please call me at 619-531-5274 should you have any questions or comments.
ALEX A. MARTINEZ
Initial Report -
March 2, 2004 Election
March 10, 2004
This is the first in a series of reports that will be issued over the next several months as we conduct a comprehensive examination of the March 2 Primary Election. The initial report focuses on the events of March 2 based on information available to date.
This report has been compiled by a Review Team headed by Deputy Chief Administrative Officer Alex Martinez. The team consists of senior managers and staff from various County departments and the Registrar's office including former Registrar Mikel Haas.
Future reports will be issued as we receive and analyze information from the following sources:
1. Poll workers - We are actively seeking information from poll workers and field troubleshooters to identify every issue that was encountered at their polling locations.
2. Diebold - The equipment manufacturer is undertaking an extensive technical examination of the cause of the Precinct Command Modules (PCM) failure to properly boot. This analysis will take approximately two weeks.
3. Citizen comments and complaints - To date, 105 comments and complaints both positive and negative have been received from citizens and poll workers. Each of these are being investigated and responded to for inclusion in future reports.
4. Registrar Canvassing Results - The Registrar's office is conducting the normal canvassing activity required to certify election results. The canvassing period concludes 28 days after an election.
5. Independent Evaluation - The Secretary of State ordered an independent body to conduct parallel monitoring of the election. The results of that effort will be provided within the next several weeks.
In September 2001, the Secretary of State took action to decertify the Votomatic voting systems used in San Diego County for more than two decades. Additionally, as a result of a lawsuit in California, a Federal judge issued an order in February 2002 requiring counties to replace their pre-scored punch card voting systems by 2004.
On April 16, 2002, the Board of Supervisors authorized the issuance of a Request for Proposals (RFP) to acquire a Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting system that is integrated, or can be integrated with, an optical scan system. The Board further directed that the system be touch screen, be a self-contained or stand-alone system, and have multiple language capabilities, as well as specially designed audio/voice capabilities for the blind and disabled communities.
On December 9, 2003, the Board of Supervisors authorized the funding of nearly $31 Million for 10,200 of Diebold's Accu-Vote TSx model touch screen devices and integrated absentee ballot system. $28 Million is being provided by State and Federal funding sources.
On March 2, 2004, the County of San Diego conducted the largest rollout of an electronic voting system of any local jurisdiction in the United States. This included the use of 10,000 touch-screen voting machines, 6,800 poll workers, and 1,611 polling places. Some 600,000 ballots were cast with over 400,000 cast at the polls.
Primary elections are more complex than General elections. There were seven party choices, and nonpartisan voters were allowed to choose to vote their nonpartisan ballot or to "cross over" to three additional party ballot choices. Thirty-three versions of the ballot were provided to each polling place via the touch screens.
This election was monitored by several entities including the Office of the California Secretary of State, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the California Department of Justice. Any feedback received will be incorporated in future reports.
Election Preparation Activities
Since the decertification of the punch card ballots The Registrar's office has been on an aggressive schedule to provide a certified voting solution for San Diego County residents. The Registrar and Diebold expended significant effort prior to the election programming, testing equipment, and preparing poll workers and citizens for the electronic voting process.
Recruitment of Poll Workers
Recruitment of the needed 6,800 poll workers for 1,611 polling places began in mid-November of 2003 with the mailing of a recruitment letter to poll workers who had helped in the past and also to a new group of people who had expressed interest in helping out at the election. Recruitment efforts continued through the use of press releases, referrals, and other means all the way up to the day prior to the election, filling in vacant slots and covering for poll workers who had dropped out. Because of the move to the new voting system, the Registrar of Voters recruited 600 more poll workers than in past elections. A new County employee poll worker program was implemented, and approximately 900 County staff served in key poll worker positions throughout the day.
Training of Poll Workers
In prior elections, two poll workers-a Precinct Inspector and Assistant Precinct Inspector-were trained on the voting equipment, election processes and the legal aspects of operating the polls. Because of new procedures and requirements for the touch screen machines, two more positions were added-the Systems Inspector and the Systems Assistant-who were responsible for the set up and operation of the machines.
Each of the more than 3,200 Systems Inspector and Assistant Systems Inspector received 21/2 hours of hands-on training specifically on setting the equipment up, creating voter access cards, logging into the card-encoding devices, use of the touch screens, and closing down the equipment at the end of election day.
The Precinct Inspector and Assistant Precinct Inspector received two hours of training on the election processes and the legal aspects of operating the polls (e.g. provisional voting, nonpartisan cross-overs, etc.). They also had an opportunity to try the new equipment, but were not trained on the detailed operation of the machines.
All poll workers received a detailed guide and procedural checklist to help them through the various processes of the day, from set-up in the morning to closing at the end of the day. Troubleshooting tips were mailed to the Systems Inspectors the week prior to the election.
To ensure that the voting equipment was at the polling site in a timely manner, poll workers were instructed to set up the equipment at their precinct the night before the election and be at the polling site by 6:30 a.m. If they were unable to set up the night before, they were told to be at their polling site by 5:30 a.m. Equipment was issued to the Systems Inspectors during training. For security reasons, the equipment was kept under seal and could not be activated until the morning of the election.
Testing of Equipment
The touch screens and related equipment-both hardware and software-went through Federal testing at certified Independent Testing Authorities. Subsequently, the California Secretary of State's technical expert reviewed the equipment and the Secretary of State approved the touch screen machines for use on November 10, 2003, and subsequently approved use of the PCM devices on February 21, 2004.
All 10,200 touch screens and 1,700 Precinct Control Modules underwent acceptance testing at the Registrar of Voters.
Troubleshooter Hotline and Other Phone Support
The Registrar of Voters had the following phone support available to answer questions from the polling places:
. 11 troubleshooter hotline phones. All poll workers were provided with this phone number.
. 12 direct lines to recruitment staff that had been working with the poll workers during the weeks and months prior to the election.
. 38 Registrar of Voters phone bank lines that supplemented the other lines during the peak incident period.
. 10 dispatch phones for communicating with Supervising Troubleshooters.
. 26 Supervising Troubleshooters.
Diebold also had 12 staff at the Registrar's office to assist with technical support and to address systems questions.
Other Registrar of Voters staff also stepped in to deal with calls and to give instructions.
The Registrar of Voters recruited 26 Supervising Troubleshooters, who were available in the field from 5:30 a.m. until the polls closed on Election Day. These Supervisors were coordinating and working with approximately 200 Rovers who were supplied by Diebold, each assigned to monitor a set of polling places in their designated area. Rovers began making their rounds at 5:30 a.m. as well.
The Registrar of Voters made a significant effort to educate the public on the use of the new system. A public education campaign was developed with the help of the contractor. This included a web site, educational brochures and other written materials, and an instructional video. Additionally, teams from the Registrar of Voters demonstrated the equipment at shopping malls and at community meetings throughout the county during the months preceding the election. More than 60 demonstrations were conducted, reaching more than 5,000 voters.
Each polling location received four to eight Diebold TSx touch screen voting machines, based on the number of registered voters, and a Precinct Control Module (PCM). The system used in this election uses an encoded card to give voters access to their appropriate ballot on the touch screen machines. These access cards are encoded by the PCM. The encoded card is then inserted into one of the voting machines to activate the appropriate ballot for each individual voter.
Early on election morning poll workers at each polling site removed the PCM from its sealed case and set it up. At approximately 40% of the sites, poll workers found that the machine did not display the expected login screen. Some of the more computer-savvy poll workers were able to maneuver through a series of screens until they found the specific login screen upon which they had been trained. Other poll workers did not, as they had only been trained with the expected screen. Therefore, they were not able to perform the card-encoding function. Without the ability to encode the electronic ballot cards at those polls, voters could not vote. There were no back-up paper ballots at the polling locations. Provisional ballots were also electronic. Therefore, many poll workers could not open the polls for voting at 7 a.m.
As a back up for a potential PCM failure, the 26 Supervising Troubleshooters and 200 Rovers were trained to convert one of the TSx machines into a card encoder. However, poll workers were not trained on this procedure since it required an additional level of technical acumen. These poll workers were dependent upon reaching the troubleshooter hotline to help guide them through any technical problems.
Supervising Troubleshooters and hotline workers, assisted by Diebold staff in the Registrar's office, had a list of troubleshooting tips and were able to identify and fix this problem in minutes. The actual fix was a four-click process that took less than one minute to execute. Rovers in the field were able to assist in the resolution of the problem at many polls. At a few locations, voters actually assisted poll workers in maneuvering through the start up process to reach the login screen. These citizens did not have access to the PCM during login nor did they have access to the touchscreen software.
Many poll workers, however, were unable to reach help immediately because of the large number of calls coming in during a very narrow window of time.
At 7 a.m. 64%(1,038 of 1,611) of polling sites were operational. By 8:00 a.m., 88% (1,419) were open and by 9:00 a.m., 98% (1,580) were open. Before 10:00 a.m., 21 more polls were open. Nine additional polls were open after 10 a.m. and the one final poll opened at 11:05 a.m.
Attachment "A" is a color-coded precinct map depicting the delays experienced at
the polling sites.
Download the map - PDF document - 525k
As evidenced by the maps, delayed openings were random and equally distributed throughout the county.
By 9:00 a.m., the call volume at the troubleshooter hotline had diminished significantly. The troubleshooting desk then began to contact each polling site to verify they were open and voting. No other major problems were reported.
There were reports throughout the day of some touchscreens not operating. All polling places had a sufficient number of machines to handle the volume of voters, and there was no impact to voting.
The polls closed at precisely 8:00 p.m., with no problems reported. Early absentee ballots were reported at 8:15 p.m. The first ballots began arriving at the Registrar's office at 8:40 p.m. By 11:30 p.m., all ballots and all equipment had arrived except two trucks that experienced minor mechanical trouble. These two trucks arrived by midnight. Shortly thereafter, all equipment was back at the Registrar's office, accounted for and in its place with all precincts reporting.
Other California Counties
Many counties throughout California conducted this election on new systems, including optical-scan equipment, as well as electronic touch-screen devices from Diebold and other manufacturers. Alameda County utilized the same PCM devices used in San Diego, and experienced similar difficulties.
Orange County used electronic voting machines from another manufacturer, and it was reported that problems from a design issue caused poll workers to issue 7,000 incorrect ballots. San Bernardino County experienced delays with their electronic system in the memory card download process. As a result, they were unable to report results until early the following morning.
The counties of Sacramento, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Santa Barbara, who chose to use optical scan technology are being challenged by a lawsuit on behalf of California voters with vision and manual dexterity impairments claiming violations of state and federal laws. The suit demands access to touch screen machines for disabled voters, and challenges the requirement for voter-verified paper audit trails.
Post-Election Canvass Activities
Following Election Day, there are still ballots to be added: absentee ballots turned in at the polls, provisional ballots to be researched, and write-in votes cast. Official results of the election cannot be certified until completion of the official canvass-a mandatory audit of the election that ensures the accuracy of the results. State law provides 28 days to complete this task, thus recognizing the complexity and importance of completing the count and audit procedures. Each and every one of the County's 1,611 precincts, as well as the absentee ballot system, is audited to account for all ballots. The official canvass includes a manual recount of paper images of ballots from a minimum of 1% of the precincts, which must include every contest and ballot measure in the County to ensure the accuracy of the computerized ballot counting system. Completion of the official canvass and certification of the final results is anticipated on or before March 30.
Citizen Comments and Complaints
Since the election, approximately 105 people have contacted the Board of Supervisors, Chief Administrative Office or Registrar of Voters with a range of comments, complaints, suggestions and combinations thereof.
All of the communications received are being tracked by the Review Team, and each one is being reviewed. Staff is also researching any comments made by voters to the media, to the extent possible.
Some voters were inconvenienced and several were angry because they were not able to return to vote. Others remain opposed to any system that does not provide each voter with a "verifiable paper trail".
Comments were received from voters and poll workers that contain valuable suggestions for improvements that will be incorporated into the administration of future elections. Some comments included praise for the new systems; several individuals said touch screens were a big improvement, particularly for the disabled community. A number of senior citizens said they were pleasantly surprised at how easy the machines were to use.
Attachment "B" summarizes the comments and findings to date.
Most aspects of the March 2 election went very well. Voters expressed positive feedback about the machines to reporters and election officials; there have been no breaches of security reported, nor any count irregularities, and the results were delivered in a timely manner. For the first time, visually impaired voters were able to vote unassisted and the ballot was provided in the three languages-English, Spanish, and Tagalog-mandated in San Diego County.
However, there were problems that must be addressed. Most importantly, there was a significant and unexpected problem, which resulted in the delayed opening of 573 out of 1,611 polling places. This inconvenienced many voters, some of whom returned later or went to another polling site, and some who were unable to return at all to vote. There is no method to accurately measure how many voters were unable to vote.
Approximately 40% of the PCM devices failed to "boot-up" to the correct screen when turned on by the poll workers. Diebold Election Systems, manufacturer of the voting machines has made a preliminary determination that the problem experienced with the PCM devices was caused by an unexpected discharge of the internal battery. This loss of power caused an unfamiliar screen to come up for poll workers upon start up. Diebold has a team of engineers working to determine the cause of the battery drain, and expects to issue a report in approximately two weeks.
The possibility of this large-scale hardware problem was not anticipated by the manufacturer. However, it was determined to be a possibility on a smaller scale and 26 supervising troubleshooters were armed with the remedy, as they were for other potential issues that might arise.
Technical support in the field was not consistent in that some precincts received support, and others never received a visit from their roving support person.
Means of communication, both to and from the precincts, was inadequate. Because of the large number of precincts experiencing problems at the same time, phone lines to the troubleshooting hotline were overloaded early in the morning. There were approximately 200 Rovers in the field who were assigned to visit polls in the early morning hours to assist with equipment set-up. The timing of these visits allowed some of the Rovers to help the poll workers with this problem, either prior to 7 a.m., or shortly thereafter. However, in other cases, the poll workers had to call the troubleshooting hotline, as they did not have any way of directly contacting Rovers in the field. The lack of ability to directly and simultaneously provide communication to the polling sites increased the delay in getting the poll sites open and operating.
In years past, poll workers were instructed to test their equipment prior to Election Day and to return faulty equipment for replacement-providing adequate time to identify and fix problems. Because of added security measures and the need to seal all equipment until election morning, poll workers were not able to test the functioning of the equipment in the days prior to the election. The period for identifying problems and communicating them was reduced to minutes rather than days.
Many of the polling places are in buildings that, while good for public access, can be problematic for communication between the Registrar's office and the poll workers, and for gaining adequate access to the facility. For example, many polls are held at churches and schools. In order for the Registrar's staff to contact poll workers, they have to first contact the church or school office, which then must get word to the poll workers. Additionally, some poll workers reported difficulties in coordinating with facilities staff to ensure that the facilities are unlocked and available for set-up.
Expanded training is required. Poll workers were trained in the setup and use of the electronic voting machines and the PCM devices. Additionally, poll workers received a detailed training manual and procedural checklist to use as a reference guide throughout the day. The reference guide did not include the fix to the PCM. A widespread problem with the PCM devices was considered to be "low probability." Therefore, no alternative methods for gaining access to the login screen or encoding voter access cards were given to the poll workers. Using a common triage approach, only the 26 supervising troubleshooters and support staff at the Registrar of Voters were trained to handle this PCM problem. Approximately 400 poll workers are not trained due to the nature of their clerical duties at the polling place.
Existing back-up plans were not adequate to handle the widespread difficulties that resulted in delayed opening of many polling sites. Back-up plans were geared towards problems at a small percentage of polling places. It was not contemplated that a widespread number of polling sites would simultaneously face this failure. In the event of a PCM failure, rovers were supplied with extra PCMs. Additionally 226 troubleshooters were trained to convert touchscreens to card activators.
Alameda County experienced the same problem with their PCMs, but they were able to issue paper Provisional ballots to some voters. Because the problem was so widespread, they soon ran out of paper ballots and were forced to turn voters away.
The Review team is currently interviewing poll workers and troubleshooters to determine the nature and extent of problems experienced on March 2. As with any election, minor problems were identified throughout the day, and ongoing analysis will be performed. The Review Team will also analyze reports received from external entities, as well as the summary results of the post-election canvassing activities to determine if there are any other significant issues that have surfaced. Subsequent reports will be issued as determinations are made, and as other agencies complete their reports.
The experience of this election has direct impacts on how the Registrar will prepare for and conduct future elections. As further analysis and feedback from pollworkers is received, action plans will be created to address all of the lessons learned.
The following actions will be taken prior to the November election:
. The source of the battery discharge problems will be identified and
corrected by the equipment manufacturer.
. Communications capacity will be expanded, including but not limited to, the ability to communicate to all polling places simultaneously; increase call-in capacity at the troubleshooting hotline; and provide poll worker-to-supervising trouble shooter communications.
. Increase technical skill requirements for poll workers.
. Provide more extensive written troubleshooting instructions, including scenarios and fixes at each polling site.
. Enhance and increase training hours for hands-on technical staff.
. Provide back-up ballot options at all polling sites.
. Provide instruction to convert backup machine to card encoder to each polling site.
. Examine methods for distribution of voting equipment and supplies.
. Create new criteria for polling places to facilitate improved communications.
. Implement new timeline requirements for set-up and testing at polling places.
. Develop check-in system to notify Registrar's office when polling place is open.
. Explore regional "early voting" centers.
. Pursue legislation that would provide for regional election-day "super voting centers" to improve efficiency and quality of service.
The Review Team will be able to create a much more detailed picture in the coming weeks and months of what went wrong - and what went right - during the March 2, 2004 Presidential Primary election. Information will continue to be gathered to improve the process for the November general election, and to eliminate the technical problems that occurred with the roll-out of the County's new touch-screen voting system.
There remains much work to do, from improving poll worker training and communications, to making sure there is an adequate backup system that allows voters to cast their ballots in case of an equipment problem.
Discussions will continue with all vital parties in the election process, from voters and poll workers, to the vendor and outside agencies such as state and federal elections officials. The Review Team will maintain contact with other counties to find out how they have dealt with any common problems.
Although there was an overwhelmingly positive voter reaction to the new system, there remains an ongoing commitment to swiftly identifying the factors that led to the delayed poll openings in the March 2 election, and making sure those problems are behind us.
To that end, the Review Team will provide regular updates as we approach the November election. The County's goal is to run the most efficient, secure and accurate elections that we possibly can for the voters of San Diego County.
Summary of Public Comments Received
Regarding March 2, 2004 Primary Election
A voter said the machine rejected her card and she voted again. She believed she voted twice.
The poll worker correctly gave the voter a provisional ballot after she claimed that the machine had rejected her initial ballot. During the canvassing process, machine counts will be audited. If it is determined that the voters' initial ballot was included in the vote count then her provisional ballot will not be added to the vote count.
A voter said he found the icon colors & location on the screen confusing and pressed "cast ballot" by accident, before he was finished voting.
A new version of software should be in place for the November election. It revises the screen format to ask each voter twice if they are ready to record their vote - giving all voters a second opportunity to review their vote.
Some voters questioned whether there is a verifiable paper trail or ability to recount ballots in close races.
The County's current system includes the capability of printing an image of every ballot cast. However, it does not print a receipt for each voter. There is no system certified for use in California that provides a voter verifiable paper audit trail. The California Secretary of State will require such a system be developed and in place by July 2006. The equipment manufacturer, Diebold, will be providing this enhancement by the required deadline, at no additional cost to the County.
When a poll closed, the number of signatures on the voter log exceeded the number of votes recorded on the machine printouts. Poll workers and voters they spoke to thought the machines "lost" some votes.
Provisional ballots cast at the poll are not included in the machine printouts, because the voter's eligibility has to be reviewed and validated by ROV staff. These votes are added to the vote count only after they have been validated. No votes have been lost.
Several voters reported that they needed to vote early & didn't have time to travel to the ROV office, another poll site or return later to their own poll and thus were unable to vote.
Technical and physical back-up systems will be in place for the November election.
Some poll workers had trouble gaining access to polling locations controlled by others. Some poll workers had no easily accessible phone. Since many polls are located in schools, churches and other public buildings, it is sometimes difficult to gain early morning access. Additionally, phone lines are not always available in these locations, making communications more difficult. Polling site criteria will be updated. Additionally, alternative methods for communicating with the poll workers will be implemented.
Poll workers reported problems with the PCMs. Many did not know how to re-boot the PCMs or move from the Windows screen that appeared on some. One poll worker said their PCM froze.
The equipment manufacturer will determine the cause of the problem and correct it for the November election. Their report is expected in approximately two weeks. Poll workers said they couldn't contact the Registrar's hotline because it was busy. Poll workers also could not contact Diebold rovers or County troubleshooters.
It has been determined the communication capacity in place on March 2 was insufficient for the number of calls coming in. It will be enhanced and improved with emphasis on the ability to communicate with all polling places simultaneously.
Many voters and poll workers suggested that poll workers receive more training on both the touchscreen equipment and current election law.
Prior to the November 2004 election, the technical skill requirements for many poll workers will be increased. More extensive written troubleshooting instructions will be provided to all polling locations. Technical staff will receive more training. The ROV will also meet with other counties to address the issue of how to recruit increasingly larger numbers of poll workers (6,800 in San Diego County) who are willing and able to handle increasingly complex elections and election laws.
Some voters complained that their sample ballot was different than their actual ballot.
A combined sample ballot pamphlet (all parties in one booklet) was printed for this election. An explanation to voters was provided on the front cover of the pamphlet. This practice is under review.
Some voters thought that every voter should have to show identification.
A new federal law required first-time registrants who did not provide identification with their voter registration affidavit to provide identification at the polls. Law forbids poll workers from requesting identification from any other voters at the polls.
Some voters said they were given the wrong ballot.
We are investigating each individual complaint. Thus far, in every case, the voter was given the correct ballot. Many voters did not realize how party registration determines the ballot a voter is allowed to use and the races they may vote on.
Some voters believed they were unable to vote for races they thought they should be voting on at their own polling place.
In each case, the voter was mistaken as to the boundaries in the races they questioned. To date, no voters were allowed to vote on races they shouldn't have, nor any denied a vote on races they should have voted on.
Voters reported being "handed provisional ballots" to vote on when their polling places could not open. They say they refused to cast provisional ballots. There were no paper provisional ballots to "hand out" at any polling place. Provisional ballots were cast on the touch screen machines. If the polling place was unable to open due to PCM problems, provisionals could not be cast. If a polling place was open and a voter cast a provisional vote, they signed a document acknowledging they were casting a provisional vote.
Some voters registered Non-Partisan. They were unhappy they could not vote for certain candidates.
California ran a modified closed primary. If you registered NP three parties allowed you to vote for their candidates. The Democrats, Republicans, and American Independents allowed "cross-over" voting but only in certain races, not all races.
Touch screens were not working at the polling place.
We have contacted each polling site and determined that each location had touch screens that were up and running throughout the remainder of the day once the PCM issue was resolved. There were some touch screens that were not in service at some locations for various reasons but there were sufficient machines operating in each location to allow voting to continue throughout the day.
Seals on the voting equipment could easily be removed and replaced thereby allowing machines to be tampered with.
Special security seals are used which show when a seal has been tampered with. For example, if a seal is removed and later replaced, the lettering on the seal would show distortion. There were no reports of broken seals or tampering on election day.
Poll workers were not asked to show their identification when receiving their equipment.
Poll workers signed a log when receiving equipment. We will re-evaluate the process to determine if picture identification should be required.
Copyright 2004 Union-Tribune Publishing Co.