August 5, 2004

 

Assemblyman Sheldon Silver

Speaker, New York State Assembly

LOB 932

Albany, NY 12248

 

Dear Assemblyman Silver

 

We are concerned with the legal standards that New York State may set for new voting machines. We appreciate Assemblyman Keith Wright's excellent bill passed by the Assembly, A-8847-A.

 

We would prefer to vote on paper ballots that can be counted by hand or optical scanner. Everyone understands the security problems associated with paper ballots, and our Boards of Election know how to handle them.

 

Very few people understand how to guard the security of computers. We believe that our county and state Boards of Election will NOT have the resources and staff to prepare for the use of secure electronic voting systems in the foreseeable future. We believe it is best to avoid the use of electronic voting systems because their use will require privatization of elections and the use of unobservable procedures, thus inviting and concealing election fraud.

 

Before New York spends any money at all on computerized voting equipment, or uses computers to record and count our votes, we would like to see these protections in law:

 

1. All software and other programming used in electronic voting and ballot tabulating equipment, as well as all certification reports from Independent Testing Authorities, must be posted on our state Board of Elections website so that the public can view them.  It is inappropriate in a democracy for the state to force voters to use secret unobservable procedures for elections-- so at least we should be able to read the software and certification reports.

 

2. Requiring a voter-verified paper audit trail is an essential first step, but New York must also treat these voter-verified paper ballots as the ballots of record to be counted (and recounted as needed).  Electronic ballots and tallies may be used to conduct a professional quality end-of-election-day ballot reconciliation procedure, such as proposed by the Open Voting Consortium, to verify the tallies of paper ballots and as a mechanism to detect ballot box stuffing, theft of ballots, or computer errors. We do not believe that electronic ballots and tallies, and a random recount of a small percentage of paper ballots, is trustworthy.

 

3. Ban wireless communication devices in vote recording and tabulating equipment.

 

Respectfully yours,

 

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