www.wheresthepaper.org/NYCshouldChoosePBOS.htm

Teresa Hommel

June 29, 2005

 

 

 

 

 

New York City Should Choose PBOS

(Paper Ballots, Optical Scanners, and

Automark Ballot-markers for voters with special needs)

 

New York City Should NOT Buy Into Evoting

 

 

 

 

A. Jurisdictions with PBOS love PBOS.

 

1. "Optical Scan Survey Results"

     http://www.nyvv.org/reports/OptScanSurvey.pdf

 

B. Many voters with disabilities are enthusiastic about the Automark, and are concerned

    about the security of their vote as well as accessibility.

 

2. Automark: "AutoMARK Quotes"

    http://www.automarkts.com/

 

C. PBOS costs much less than evoting, both initial purchase and continuing operation.

 

3. " Acquisition Costs of DRE and Precinct Based Optical Scan Voting Equipment "

      http://www.nyvv.org/reports/AcquisitionCostDREvOptScanNYS.pdf

 

4. "Paper Ballot Costs and Printing"

      http://www.nyvv.org/reports/PaperBallotPrintingCosts.pdf

 

5. "How many paper ballots must be printed for an election?"

      http://www.wheresthepaper.org/HowManyPaperBallotsAreNeeded.htm

 

6. "Comparing Annual Costs of DRE and Optical Scan systems"

      http://www.nyvv.org/reports/ComparingAnnualCosts DREvPBOS.pdf

 

7. "Cost Comparison of Voting Equipment for New York State, Touchscreen DRE with

      VVPT Printer vs. Precinct Based Optical Scan + Ballot Marking Device"

      http://www.nyvv.org/doc/CostComparisons.pdf

 

D. We should learn from the experience of other jurisdictions, such as Miami Dade County,

     Florida, which are struggling to convert to PBOS and to get rid of their evote equipment

     due to lost votes and out-of-control cost overruns.

 

8."Miami Dade County Officials Recommend Scrapping DRE system for Optical Scanners"  

     http://www.nyvv.org/reports/MiamiDadeDumpsDREs.pdf

 

9. Computerworld, April 14, 2005, "Fate of $25M e-voting system in Miami-Dade dangling"

    http://www.computerworld.com/governmenttopics/government/policy/story/0,10801,101105,00.html

 

E. We should be forewarned by the documented failures of evote vendors and their equipment.

   

10. VotersUnite.org list of failures of 7 vendors.

      http://www.votersunite.org/info/messupsbyvendor.asp

 

11. Brief Summary of New Mexico State Election Data

      http://www.nyvv.org/reports/NewMexico2004ReportSummary.pdf

 

12. Summary Report on New Mexico State Election Data

      http://www.nyvv.org/reports/NewMexico2004ElectionDataReport-v2.pdf

 

F. We should be forewarned by increasing citizen opposition to evoting. Evoting undermines voter

     confidence in the legitimacy of elections: voters cannot meaningfully witness the recording and

     casting of their own votes. Observers cannot meaningfully witness the storage, handling, and

     counting of votes.

 

13. Inside Bay Area, June 18, 2005. "Call rises to 'dump diebold'"

      http://www.insidebayarea.com/portlet/article/html/fragments/print_article.jsp?article=2810029

 

14. Daytona Beach News-Journal Online, June 8, 2005. "Voter verification"

      http://www.news-journalonline.com/NewsJournalOnline/Opinion/Editorials/03OpOPN95060805.htm

 

G. Buyer beware! Despite claims of eager vendors, we should be guided by the experience of

     other jurisdictions, warnings of computer professionals and computer scientists, past reputation

     of vendors, and the expressed distrust of voters.

 

15. "Refuting Sequoia Claims about Optical Scan"

      http://www.nyvv.org/reports/CorrectingSequoia.pdf

 

16. USA Today, "Doubts over touchscreen tech choice for Venezuela recall"

      http://www.usatoday.com/tech/world/2004-07-12-venezuela-evote_x.htm

 

17. www.MilitaresDemocraticos.com, "Coup in Venezuela, Evidence of Fraud Abounds"

      http://militaresdemocraticos.surebase.com/articulos/en/20040817-01.html

 

18. www.venered.org, "A Summary of the Tulio Alvarez Report on Fraud"

      http://www.venered.org/english/      then click "Más articulos"

 

H. Evoting means the ballot box is open to the world and unguarded because computer

     communications capability allows outside hackers and insiders, regardless of where they are

     located, to alter votes, ballots, and tallies.

 

19. "New York Should Ban Communications Capability in Voting … Equipment"

      http://www.wheresthepaper.org/BanCommunications.htm

 

I. Security concepts derived from paper ballots and mechanical lever machines won’t help us

   with computer technology.

 

20. "Paper Ballot Concepts in a Computerized World"

      http://www.wheresthepaper.org/PaperBallotConcepts.htm

 

J. Evoting undermines democracy in numerous ways, and any benefit attributed to evoting

     can be obtained with less risk from lesser technology.

 

21. "Frequently Asked Questions, Why Do Informed Citizens Oppose Electronic Voting?"

      http://www.wheresthepaper.org/EvotingFAQ.htm

 

22. "Electronic Voting - Why It's Bad For Democracy"

      http://www.wheresthepaper.org/Evoting_BadForDemocracy.htm

 

K. Computer security is impossible to control. When major financial institutions with

    sophisticated computer security departments experience massive losses, how will Boards

    of Elections prevent electronic tampering with computerized elections?

 

23. USA Today, "40 Million credit card holders may be at risk"

      http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/general/2005-06-19-breach-usat_x.htm?csp=34

 

L. More information about PBOS.

 

24. “Precinct Based Optical Scan Voting Systems”

      http://www.nyvv.org/doc/IntroToOptScan.pdf

 

            25. “Advantages of Paper Ballot / Precinct Based Optical Scan Voting Systems Over Electronic

                  Touch Screen Voting Machines”

                  http://www.nyvv.org/doc/AdvantagesPaperBallots.pdf